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We study the effectiveness of a community-level information intervention aimed at improving
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tation investments. We show that community wealth, widely available in secondary data, is a key
statistic for effective intervention targeting. Using data from five other similar randomized inter-
ventions in various contexts, we find that community-level wealth heterogeneity can rationalize the
wide range of impact estimates in the literature. This exercise provides plausible external validity
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1 Introduction
Public health information campaigns are often promoted as an instrumental driver of behavioral
change and adoption of health products. But how effective are these interventions in developing
countries, especially when implemented at scale? We investigate this question in the context of a
program that has been widely introduced by governments around the world to improve access to
safe sanitation.
Comprehensive water and sanitation programmes in developed nations in the early 1900s have
been dubbed the most effective public health intervention of the last century (Alsan and Goldin,
2019) due to their significant impact on infant survival and reduction of communicable diseases. The
costs of poor sanitation and the disease environments they create - in terms of child health, mor-
tality, human capital accumulation, and economic growth - are, by now, well understood (Adukia,
2017, Alzua et al., 2018, Augsburg and Rodriguez-Lesmes, 2018, Baird et al., 2016, Spears and
Lamba, 2016).1 Yet, 4.5 billion people still lack access to safely managed sanitation worldwide
(WHO/UNICEF/JMP, 2017). Improving access to sanitation has thus been recognized by the UN
as a goal towards sustainable development. To achieve it, identifying effective policies that work in
low income countries is key.
In this paper, we show the results of a cluster randomized controlled trial (RCT) we imple-
mented to assess the Government of Nigeria’s ‘National Strategy for Scaling up Sanitation and
Hygiene’.2 We evaluate the main pillar of the governmental strategy, an intervention known as
Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), at scale. CLTS entails community meetings and the
provision of information with the aim of eradicating open defecation (OD), by triggering a desire
for collective behavioral change and encouraging communities to construct and use toilets. As part
of the experiment, CLTS was implemented in a random sample of 125 of 247 study clusters of rural
1 Low and middle income countries carry a disproportionately heavy burden for communicable diseases, such as
diarrhea (Prüss-Üstün and Corvalán, 2006). Better sanitation could, for example, prevent the majority of diarrhea-
related deaths of 361,000 children aged less than 5 years each year (Prüss-Ustün et al., 2014), and would reduce the
prevalence of worm infections in school children, which affect educational attainment and labor market outcomes
(Baird et al., 2016). For an overview, see also United Nations (2016), Water and Sanitation Program (2012)
2 Nigeria provides a suitable context to study sanitation as 34% of its population practices open defecation, toilet
ownership rates have stagnated (WHO/UNICEF, 2015) and the country contributes to a significant share of the
global population without access to adequate sanitation (WHO/UNICEF/JMP, 2017).
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communities, located in the Nigerian states Ekiti and Enugu. In each cluster, we randomly selected
20 households for interview at baseline in 2014 and in three follow-up surveys 8, 24 and 32 months
after implementation, resulting in a balanced panel of more than 4,500 households.
Our results show that, on average, CLTS led to small and temporary reductions in OD. House-
holds in treated communities were 3 percentage points (pp) less likely to declare to perform OD
than control households over a period of 24 months. These average treatment effects, however,
hide meaningful impact heterogeneity across population subgroups: we find that intervention im-
pacts are considerably stronger among, and restricted to, the asset poorest half of the studied
communities. In this sub-sample, OD fell by three times as much as on average, i.e. 9 percentage
points in the short-run (8 months post implementation). In addition, the sanitation improvement
in poor communities is sustained over time. The reduction in OD is achieved mainly through
increased toilet ownership. The effect cannot be ascribed to differences between communities in
toilet ownership at baseline. We also do not find evidence that community differences in social
capital or social interactions, public goods infrastructure or leader characteristics explain our re-
sults. Yet, communities’ socio-economic status clearly matters for the intervention effectiveness,
as community-specific impact estimates along three alternative measures of their socio-economic
status - geographic isolation, low population density and low average night light intensity (obtained
from satellite measurements) - yield estimates of similar magnitude to those for community wealth.
Using results from the Nigerian RCT and data from five recently published CLTS trials con-
ducted in other countries (Briceno et al., 2017, Cameron et al., 2019, Guiteras et al., 2015, Patil
et al., 2014, Pickering et al., 2015), we demonstrate an inverse relationship between area-level wealth
and program effectiveness beyond the Nigerian context, providing external validity to our findings
and rationalizing CLTS impact estimates across studies.
Our results have four important implications. First, we show that public health information
interventions such as CLTS can indeed trigger behavioral change in (some) population groups,
in line with results surveyed in Dupas (2011). Second, and consistent with CLTS practitioners’
experiences and priors as to where the intervention should work best (Kar and Chambers, 2008),
we pinpoint community wealth as a key factor for the impact effectiveness of this participatory
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community-level information intervention.3 We show that heterogeneous impacts by communities’
socio-economic characteristics dominate impact heterogeneity at the household level.
Third, our results have important implications for the scale-up of CLTS. We implemented
CLTS at scale, i.e. by training government officials working in WASH units (Water, Sanitation
and Hygiene) to deliver the intervention, to be able to draw policy relevant conclusions regarding a
wider rollout (Muralidharan and Niehaus, 2017).We argue, based on our findings, that a targeted
implementation of CLTS may yield larger policy returns than a blanket approach. Measures of
wealth are readily available in standard household surveys, or alternatively nightlight intensity
indices from open access satellite data. Governments can easily combine these data with findings
from RCTs to develop a more effective targeting strategy for this popular sanitation program,
which is currently implemented in more than 25 Latin American, Asian and African countries. As
an example, we demonstrate this using the 2013 Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS),
and show that the data can replicate the classification of geographical areas into poor/rich with a
precision that is similar to the measures obtained from our primary study data.
Finally, we demonstrate how heterogeneous intervention impacts can help address the widely-
acknowledged concern that the high internal validity that characterises RCTs comes with important
shortcomings in external validity (Basu, 2014, Deaton and Cartwright, 2018, Peters et al., 2018).
Wang et al. (2006) and Meager (2019) emphasize context or location-specific factors as obstacles
to external validity. We present local socio-economic status, particularly community wealth, as
common underlying factor for CLTS effectiveness, valid also outside Nigeria and, in fact, across
various diverse contexts. The results from five recently published CLTS trials (Briceno et al., 2017,
Cameron et al., 2019, Guiteras et al., 2015, Patil et al., 2014, Pickering et al., 2015) range from
very large impacts - an increase in toilet ownership of 30 percentage points, and an open defecation
reduction of 23 percentage points - in a trial in Mali (Pickering et al., 2015), to no detectable
impacts on toilet ownership in Bangladesh (Guiteras et al., 2015). We re-estimate impacts for each
of these evaluations using a harmonised method and pair impact estimates with a proxy of local
3Recent studies have tried to identify the underlying factors that drive heterogeneous impacts of interventions
across and within studies, such as Bandiera et al. (2018), Meager (2019). Cunha et al. (2018), for example, investigate
the role of community characteristics in shaping the effects of cash and in-kind transfers. They find that the degree
of integration and the size of the markets explained differential effects in local prices.
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socio-economic characteristics available for all studies, namely the average night light intensity,
observed at baseline. The inverse relationship between area-level wealth and program effectiveness
that we find in this exercise rationalizes the existing range of CLTS impact estimates across studies.
We conclude, in the spirit of Banerjee et al. (2017b), that our result from Nigeria carries plausible
external validity across various contexts.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the inter-
vention and the experimental design. In Section 3, we present the empirical method and Section 4
presents our impact estimates. Section 5 compares the results of our study to those of other CLTS
interventions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Intervention and study design
2.1 Community-Led Total Sanitation
The Government of Nigeria adopted Community-Led Total Sanitation as its major approach for
the development of rural sanitation within its Strategy for ‘Scaling up Sanitation and Hygiene’,
launched in 2007. This decision followed three years of piloting, conducted by the National Task
Group for Sanitation in collaboration with state and local governments as well as local and inter-
national NGOs such as WaterAid and UNICEF. The effort to scale-up CLTS to the whole country
began in 2008. We study the effectiveness of CLTS in the context of Nigeria’s national strategy
through a cluster-randomized controlled trial conducted in nine local government areas (LGAs)
in the states of Enugu and Ekiti that did not have any recent experience of CLTS, or CLTS-like
interventions.
CLTS is a community-level information and mobilization intervention aimed at reducing open
defecation and improving toilet coverage. It is typically implemented in three steps. The firsts step
focuses on mobilization: Community leaders are approached and engaged in a discussion about
the negative health implications of OD4, as well as the potential benefits of CLTS in achieving
behavioral change within their communities. The aim of the meeting is to convince community
4 A further key message is the importance of sanitation externalities, i.e. that all community members (particularly
children) are at risk of contracting sanitation-related diseases if some residents practise open defecation.
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leaders to arrange a community meeting. This meeting, the so-called ‘triggering meeting’, marks
the second step, and the main component of CLTS. The meeting starts once and only if a significant
number of community members gathered in a predefined public space on the identified day. The first
activity is typically a community mapping exercise, in which each attending community member
marks their household’s location and toilet ownership status on a stylized map on the ground.
Community members next identify regular OD sites and mark these as well. In many cases, this
exercise is used by facilitators to follow up with graphic images showing that the community lives
in an environment contaminated by feces. Facilitators of the meetings further use the map to trace
the community’s contamination paths of human feces into water supplies and food.5
As a closing task, attendees are asked to draw up a community action plan to achieve community-
level open defecation free (ODF) status. This aspect of CLTS seeks to foster collective action and
collaboration. It includes discussions of how poor or vulnerable households can be supported to
achieve ODF status. The action plan is posted in a public spot. Volunteers (so-called ‘natural
leaders’) are chosen to follow up regularly on each attendee’s commitment towards implementing
the plan, the thirs step of CLTS. Followup visits by the facilitators are organized. Eventually,
the community might be certified for its achievements by the national Rural Water Supply and
Sanitation Agency (RWASSA) and the National Task Group on Sanitation (NTGS).
CLTS does not offer any monetary incentives, subsidies or credit to finance toilet construction
or reward OD reductions or ODF achievement, nor is technical assistance or hardware provided.
Neither does it promote a particular toilet technology. The aim is to drive a change in sanitation
practices purely by altering the perceived costs of unsafe sanitation and the perceived benefits of
toilet use.
5 A number of other activities may follow, at the discretion of the facilitator. Examples include transect walks
through the community (often referred to as ‘walks of shame’), pointing out visible feces in the environment to evoke
further disgust and shame; medical expense calculations related to illnesses likely induced by OD practices; or graphic
exercises, where facilitators might add feces to drinking water, illustrating that these are not necessarily visible to the
naked eye. In the context of our study, only about 20% of triggering meetings included at least one such additional
exercise, graphic illustration being the most popular one (implemented in 14% of triggering meetings) followed by
expense calculations (7%).
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2.2 Experimental design and intervention implementation
We study the effectiveness of CLTS in the context of Nigeria’s national strategy through an RCT
conducted in collaboration with the international non-governmental organisation (NGO) Wat-
erAid.6 WaterAid worked closely with local government areas (LGAs)7 and two local resource
agencies (NGOs from Ekiti and Enugu) to implement CLTS in two of Nigeria’s 36 states, Ekiti,
Enugu.8 Specifically, WaterAid Nigeria and the two local NGOs conducted CLTS training sessions,
one in each state. These sessions trained the LGA water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) units,
which are part of Nigeria’s public service, who then conducted the CLTS mobilization, triggering
meetings and followup activities. Four LGAs without recent experience of CLTS, or CLTS-like
interventions, were selected in Enugu and 5 in Ekiti. Their locations are indicated in Figure 1.9
Figure 1
Map of the study area in the Nigerian states of Ekiti and Enugu
Note: Study clusters in the nine selected LGAs (shaded) from Ekiti (left) and Enugu (right).
6 The study protocol was approved by the following IRBs: National Health Research Ethics Committee, Federal
Ministry of Health, Nigeria (NHREC/01/01/2007-20-20/11/2014), University College London Ethics Committee
(2168/009). The trial was registered at the ISRCTN registry (ISRCTN74165567). We note that the research project
intended to also evaluate a supply intervention, Sanitation Marketing (SanMark). However, SanMark development
and piloting took longer than planned and implementation had been in place not long enough at the time of the
endline survey to conduct a full impact analysis. Details are outlined in the project’s final report (Abramovsky et al.,
2018).
7 LGAs are Nigeria’s second sub-division after states. LGAs are administrative divisions led by a Local Government
Council.
8 A third state, Jigawa, was dropped due to budget limitations and security concerns.
9 Study LGAs in Enugu are Igbo Eze North, Igbo Eze South, Nkanu East and Udenu. In Ekiti, Ido Osi, Ikole,
Moba, Irepodun Ifelodun and Ekiti South West are part of the study.
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Since CLTS is a community-level intervention, we used what we refer to as ‘triggerable clus-
ters’ as the unit of randomization. Triggerable clusters are groups of geographically close villages,
neighbourhoods or quarters. These clusters were defined jointly by the researchers and the imple-
menters. Hence, they do not match any of Nigeria’s administrative units. Clusters were chosen
with the view of reducing information spillover, e.g. to be self-contained units so that information
about triggering activities would not spread to the next cluster. This implies, for example, that
triggerable clusters do not share markets or large public areas. To further reduce potential contam-
ination between experimental treatment and control clusters, ‘buffer’ areas were introduced around
triggerable clusters to ensure that no two clusters were located in close geographic proximity. No
specific distance was imposed. The definition of the ‘triggerable clusters’ and their buffer zones was
driven by implementers’ previous experiences from working in these areas.
In both study states, a cluster comprises of on average 1.7 villages or quarters10, all of which
CLTS was implemented at the same time. The treatment period during which mobilization and
triggering activities took place lasted about six months – between January and June 2015.
In total, we identified 247 ‘triggerable clusters’. 246 of these were randomized with equal
probability into either receiving CLTS (treatment) or not receiving it during the course of the
study (control).11 Randomization was stratified by LGA. The distribution of treatment and control
clusters is presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Number of triggerable clusters per study arm and state
Control CLTS Total
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Ekiti 63 51.6 66 52.8 129 52.2
Enugu 59 48.4 59 47.2 118 47.8
Total 122 100.0 125 100.0 247 100.0
10 The median and modal number of villages or quarters within a cluster is 1. The maximum number of villages
in a cluster is 7, occurring only once.
11 One cluster from the original sampling was subsequently dropped since data collection in any post-treatment
survey wave was not possible due to civil unrest in the community.
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2.3 Respondent sampling, data collection and attrition
We collected five rounds of data over a time span of almost three and a half years.12 The sampling
frame was established in October 2014 through the first round of data collection, a household
census in the nine participating LGAs from Ekiti and Enugu. The census collected basic household
information from 50,333 households (27,888 from Enugu and 22,445 from Ekiti).13 Based on this
census, we randomly selected 20 households from each cluster for interview. Our sample is thus
a representative panel of households in the nine LGAs. This is in contrast to other studies which
restricted their samples to households with children (Briceno et al. (2015), Cameron et al. (2019),
Pickering et al. (2015)). Our final sample consists of 4,671 households in the 246 clusters, distributed
evenly across Ekiti and Enugu, and covering around 9% of the population in the study area. A
baseline survey was conducted during December 2014 and January 2015. The first follow-up survey
(FU1) took place between December 2015 and February 2016 eight months after implementation,
on average. FU2 took place 24 months after implementation (March-April 2017) and FU3 (which
we also refer to as the ‘endline survey’) after 32 months (between November 2017 and January
2018). The three followup surveys allow us to study the dynamics of CLTS impacts over time,
providing insight into the sustainability of program impacts. Figure 2 summarizes intervention and
data collection timings.
Figure 2
Project timeline: implementation and data collection waves
time
2014 2015 2016 2017
Baseline CLTS FU 1 FU 2 FU3
12Data collection was carried out by an independent data collection company, blinded to treatment status.
13 Initial estimates of the size of triggering clusters in the implementation plan were around 150 households. In the
field, cluster sizes turned out to be larger. Budget limitations constrained the listing to a maximum of 180 households
per cluster. To achieve a representative sample of households, we adopted the following approach: For each triggerable
cluster, we randomly ordered the villages/quarters and started the listing exercise at the top of the list. The first
village/quarter was listed completely, independent of its size (i.e. going above the 180 households threshold if needed).
If less than 150 households were listed, data collection would continue in the second village/quarter on the list, again
listing every household in this village/quarter. This process continued until either all villages/quarters were listed
in each cluster, or until around 180 households were reached. This approach ensured that we have listing data from
each of the study clusters, that our overall sample remains representative for the study area (since the ordering of
village/quarter listing was randomly determined), and furthermore that whole villages and quarters were listed while
keeping within budget.
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Our study had low attrition rates across the three followup survey rounds: 2.53% at FU1, 8.81%
at FU2 and 11.58% at FU3 as shown in Appendix Table 12. A possible concern is that non-response
was not random across treatment and control villages, which could bias estimated treatment effects.
The lower panel of Table 2 shows that there is no significant difference between attrition levels in
the control and intervention clusters at the time of the endline survey, FU3, with attrition rates
of 11.14 for households in control and 12.05 in treatment areas. The same conclusion holds for
differential attrition by treatment status during FU1 and FU2 (Annex Table 12). To investigate
this more formally, we test whether treatment status can predict attrition conditional on district
fixed effects and household-level baseline characteristics (Annex Table 13). Overall, the coefficient
of the treatment dummy is close to zero and never statistically significant in any of the three
followup surveys or estimated specifications. This suggests that selective attrition is not a concern.
We therefore focus our analysis on the balanced panel of 4,540 households which were successfully
interviewed in each round of data collection.
2.4 The study population and treatment-control balance
As the allocation of clusters to treatment and control was random, we expect no systematic differ-
ences between both groups at the time of the baseline survey. We check balancedness in Table 2,
presenting summary statistics for the main characteristics of study households, the outcomes we
consider and characteristics of the study communities. For each variable we present the baseline
mean for the control group (in the post attrition sample) and the difference in means between
control and treatment groups (reporting the p-value for a t-test of equality of these means in the
last column).
As expected, there are no statistically significant differences between the two groups along the
presented dimensions,14 except a small (0.27) difference in the number of household members. In
an F-test of joint significance of all characteristics, we reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level
(p-value=0.038). Yet, once we remove household size, the explanatory power of the remaining
variables falls markedly (p-value=0.27), supporting the validity of our randomization strategy,
14 The project’s baseline report supports balancedness on a wide range of additional variables (Abramovsky et al.,
2015).
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except regarding household size. Hence, we include this variable as a covariate throughout our
analysis.
The first panel of Table 2 reports household characteristics. Household heads in study commu-
nities are predominantly male (64%), with a mean age of 55 years. Most completed primary school
(68%) and were employed (77%). Average household size was four, with 30% living with a child
under the age of six. For 45%, farming was the main activity. We also present an asset wealth
indicator, which we will build on in our heterogeneity analysis of intervention impacts. Household
asset wealth is measured as the first factor of a principal component analysis based on a series
of questions regarding asset ownership.15 While the number value of this variable is in itself not
meaningful, it is balanced across experimental arms.
The second panel presents the main outcomes, all measured at the household level. Our primary
interest lies in households’ sanitation behavior, in particular open defecation practices, for which
we use two measures. The first variable captures whether the main survey respondent (typically a
woman) states that at least one household member above the age of four years performs OD. The
second variable takes the value one if the respondent herself declares to perform OD. Table 2 shows
that in our study population, 62.8% of households have at least one member defecating in the open
and a very similar percentage (62.4%) of women report that they follow this practice themselves.
We find that the habit of defecating in the open is closely linked to toilet ownership status.
This is in line with ownership and use of private toilets being most frequently discussed as channels
to reduce OD in CLTS meetings (Kar, 2003). 36.9% of households own a toilet, 36.1% own a
functioning toilet of any type, and 32.4% own a functioning and improved toilet. We include all
three measures in our analysis as outcomes since they capture different dimensions of interest. The
first records ownership, but ignores functionality. The second additionally captures maintenance
investments into the existing stock of toilets, or toilet divestment through lack of maintenance.
The third accounts for quality, satisfying the stricter criteria set by the WHO/UNICEF Joint
Monitoring Program regarding improved sanitation.
We acknowledge that self-reported open defecation and toilet ownership may be subject to
15 Details of its components and their factor loadings are provided in Table 10 in Appendix A.1.
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Table 2
Balance between Treatment and Control groups at Baseline
Control Treatment-Control
Obs. Obs. Mean SD Coeff. p-value
Panel A - Postattrition household sample
Household Characteristics
HH head male (%) 4,014 2,027 64.53 47.85 -1.92 0.307
HH head age (years) 4,014 2,027 55.82 17.23 -0.66 0.364
HH head employed (%) 4,014 2,027 78.10 41.37 -0.79 0.677
HH head finished primary school (%) 4,014 2,027 67.54 46.83 0.40 0.851
Household size 4,014 2,027 4.33 2.50 -0.27 0.022
Household has at least 1 child below 6 y/o (%) 4,014 2,027 30.64 46.11 -0.49 0.792
HH primary activity is farming (%) 4,014 2,027 47.11 49.93 3.06 0.414
Relative asset wealth index score 4,014 2,027 0.05 2.04 -0.02 0.879
Open Defecation and Toilet Ownership
At least 1 member (> 4 y/o) performs OD (%) 4,014 2,027 62.80 48.35 0.66 0.838
Main respondent performs OD (%) 3,974 2,008 62.40 48.45 0.47 0.884
Own a toilet (any condition, any type) (%) 4,014 2,027 36.90 48.27 -0.31 0.922
Own a functioning toilet (any type) (%) 4,014 2,027 36.11 48.04 -0.18 0.955
Own a functioning, improved toilet (%) 4,014 2,027 32.36 46.80 0.40 0.896
All members of the HH use a toilet (%) 4,014 2,027 37.20 48.35 -0.66 0.838
All members of the HH use a toilet (cond. on ownership) (%) 1,446 732 92.62 26.16 1.49 0.327
Community Characteristics
Distance to the nearest LGA HQ, in km 245 121 6.60 4.14 0.56 0.295
Number of households, 5km radius 245 121 1,590 997 -90 0.476
Community wealth 245 121 -0.21 0.95 -0.13 0.353
Night light intensity, 5km radius, 2013 (min = 0, max = 25) 245 121 2.07 3.01 -0.06 0.870
Mean trust in neighbours (0-None, 2-High) 245 121 0.88 0.49 0.01 0.847
Social capital 245 121 -0.09 1.10 0.16 0.252
Religious fragmentation (0-Low, 1-High) 245 121 0.61 0.16 0.02 0.465
Mean toilet ownership rate (%) 245 121 36.24 24.51 -1.32 0.674
Panel B - Attrition
Not surveyed at endline (%) 4,540 2,281 11.14 31.46 0.91 0.341
Notes: Data from Baseline household survey. Unit of observation: household. Panel A: sample includes only households
also surveyed at endline. Panel B: sample includes all households surveyed at baseline. Improved toilets refer to toilets
of the quality defined using the classification in WHO/UNICEF (2015). No interviews could be conducted in two
communities at endline (one treatment and one control), thus the total number of communities fell to 245. For a detailed
description of household and community-level covariates, please see Appendix A. ** p <0.05.
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measurement error - particularly to over-reporting of toilet ownership and under-reporting of OD
habits. To validate households reports of toilet ownership, interviewers asked respondents whether
they may inspect the reported latrines at the end of baseline and endline interviews. At baseline,
89% of households allowed interviewers to verify their reports (89% in control areas, 88% in CLTS
areas, p-value=0.628). Reports presented in Table 2 were corrected (i.e. observations concluded
that households did not in fact own functioning toilets although households had reported they
did) for 6% of mis-reporting households (6% in control areas, 7% in CLTS areas). If systematic
measurement error was present as a result of CLTS, then we would expect either lower consent
rates or higher rates of corrections in treatment relative to control areas at endline. Contrary to
this, only 3% of households who reported to own a toilet in FU2 refused inspection at endline,
and refusal rates are similar in treatment and control (3.5 versus 2.8%). Inspection did not yield
significant discrepancies between reported and actual ownership (observations resulted in just 10
corrections among control households, and 19 corrections among CLTS households). None of these
measures are statistically significantly different between treatment arms, and we interpret both -
the similarity of consent rates for inspection in treatment and control and the truthful reports of
ownership by consenting households in both surveys - as evidence that there is little measurement
error in self-reported latrine ownership, and little selective reporting between groups.
While we cannot monitor sanitation practice measures directly, we will show in Section 4.2
that CLTS impacts on toilet ownership are closely mirrored by reverse changes in open defecation
practice.
The third panel of Table 2 finally presents statistics for a set of community characteristics. The
communities are located on average about seven kilometers from the LGA head quarters (HQ)16
and encompass 1,616 households within a five kilometer radius. Part of our analysis, described
in detail in Section 4.2, will focus on heterogeneity in CLTS effectiveness by community socio-
economic status (SES). Both the distance to the LGA HQ and number of households within a 5k
radius are often used as proxies for SES status: distance to urban or semi-urban centers is typically
used as a measure of remoteness or isolation, and the number of households within a 5km radius,
16 This is a walk of about an hour.
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as a measure of population density. We present here, and use later, summary statistics of two
further SES proxies, namely a community wealth index based on the median household wealth in
the community,17 and a pre-intervention nightlight intensity index within a 5km radius, a proxy for
local economic wealth and income.18 We find that average nightlight intensity in our study area is
very low with a mean of two relative to the total nightlight range of 0 to 61.
The next set of community characteristics we present relate to social interactions within the
community, a dimension that has also been suggested as accelerating the effectiveness of CLTS (see
for example Cameron et al. (2019)). We capture social interactions in three ways: a community’s
level of i) trust, ii) social capital, and iii) religious fragmentation. Trust is the average community
score of household measures of the degree to which they trust their neighbors. Social capital
is constructed similarly, based on households’ participation in community events. We adapt the
measures used in studies of ethnolinguistic fragmentation (ELF) to capture religious fragmentation,
as our study sample is homogeneous along ethnic lines but very diverse in terms of religion. Detailed
definitions of these measures and their distribution can be found in Appendix A.2. We find that
religious fragmentation at 60% was higher than in 70% of the countries recorded in Alesina’s 2003
fractionalization dataset, and people somewhat trusted their neighbors (i.e about 0.9 on a 0 to 2
scale).19 These characteristics are balanced across treatment and control.
Finally, in line with household level averages, the mean toilet ownership rates in our study
clusters is 36.2%.
3 Estimation approach
We estimate the impacts of CLTS on our primary outcome, open defecation practices, using an
intent-to-treat (ITT) design based on cluster randomized assignment to treatment.20 We compare
17 Detailed lists of household asset items are frequently elicited in household surveys in developing countries, as they
are often more precise than measures of household income. The aggregated index is mean zero and has a standard
deviation of one.
18 Michalopoulos (2013) presents evidence that wealth and nightlight intensity are strongly correlated.
19 Mean social capital and community wealth are by construction close to zero.
20 Intent-to-treat designs are informative about the key parameters of interest and often carry more external validity
than estimates based on treatment recipiency, since perfect take-up of interventions is rare. As Abramovsky et al.
(2016) discuss, while leaders in all communities were approached, triggering meetings were not held in 18 communities
(14% of all treatment communities) due to insufficient number of community members coming to the planned event.
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open defecation practices yict in household i living in community (cluster) c in period t by treatment
assignment:
yict = α+ γTc +Xic0β + θyic0 + ωg + δt + ict (1)
where community-level CLTS treatment status is defined by Tc. Baseline characteristics of house-
holds and their heads, Xic0, are included to maximize precision and account for the imbalance in
household size observed at baseline. To filter out unobserved area effects and contemporaneous
shocks, we include LGA and survey wave fixed effects, ωg and δt. The parameter of interest,γ,
captures the average impact of CLTS.
Our preferred specification conditions on the baseline value of the outcome variable, yic0. The
resulting ANCOVA estimates are more efficient than difference-in-difference and simple difference
estimators in experimental contexts, when pre-treatment information is available and the outcome
is strongly correlated over time (McKenzie (2012)). Alongside, we present conventional difference-in
difference estimates that exclude the baseline value of the outcome variable.
To investigate heterogeneous impacts, we expand the specification in Equation (1):
yict = α+ γrTc + γd(Tc × CCc) + φCCc +Xic0β + θyic0 + ωg + δt + ict (2)
We introduce a binary variable CCc indicating a community characteristic, say community wealth,
split our sample of communities along its median, and include the interaction term Tc×CCc. γr is
the average CLTS treatment effect in rich communities (i.e. those for which CCc = 0), and γd is the
difference in treatment effects between rich and poor communities (i.e. those for which CCc = 1).
Since we are testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously in our analysis of heterogeneous im-
pacts, we report p-values that are adjusted for the family-wise error rate in brackets. We compute
these using the methodology proposed by Romano and Wolf (2005). Naive or unadjusted p-values
obtained from individual significant tests for each point estimate, calculated by drawing 1,000
In a successfully randomized scenario, as is our study (see Table 2), ITT designs yield unbiased estimates of the
average impact of the intervention on the sample assigned to treatment. For robustness purposes, in Appendix B we
show that there is no evidence of selective triggering in our study. Additionally, we follow Imbens and Angrist (1994)
and Angrist and Imbens (1995) and instrument triggered treatment with treatment assignment. The results are very
similar to the ITT estimates (see Appendix B).
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clustered bootstrapped samples, are shown in parentheses.
4 Results
4.1 Average impacts
We show average impact estimates on OD practices in Table 3. The first dependent variable is a
dummy equal to 1 if at least one household member above the age of four performs OD (columns
1-3)21, the second a dummy variable equal to 1 if the main respondent performs OD (columns
4-6). Columns 1-2 (4-5) present difference-in-difference estimates without (with) household char-
acteristics. Columns 3 and 6 present the ANCOVA specification described in equation 1, including
household characteristics.
Table 3
CLTS impacts on open defecation
Outcome =1 if: OD by any member OD by the main respondent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Pooled impacts
CLTS (γ) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
p-value (0.26) (0.16) (0.06) (0.22) (0.13) (0.04)
Panel B - Dynamic impacts
CLTS x FU 1 (γ1) -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
p-value (0.16) (0.11) (0.04)
CLTS x FU 2 (γ2) -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
p-value (0.18) (0.11) (0.06) (0.23) (0.14) (0.09)
CLTS x FU 3 (γ3) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
p-value (0.41) (0.31) (0.15) (0.42) (0.34) (0.22)
ANCOVA No No Yes No No Yes
Household controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
DV control mean (EL) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48
No. of communities 246 246 246 246 246 246
No. of observations 8,786 8,518 8,518 13,233 12,830 12,697
Notes: OD prevalence for any household member (columns 1-3) includes only members
above the age of four, and was not measured in the first followup survey wave. Household
controls: age, age squared, gender, education attainment level and employment status
of the household head; household size, relative wealth asset score, and a dummy variable
equal to one if farming is the household’s main economic activity. Standard errors are
clustered at the community level. p-values are shown in parenthesis.
21 Note that this question was not asked at the first follow-up survey, denoted FU1.
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Panel A pools observations across the three followup surveys. We find that CLTS reduced OD
consistently across all specifications and for both OD measures. Yet, the magnitude of behavioural
change is small (around 3pp). As expected, the estimated coefficients are identical across speci-
fications, but precision is highest when accounting for the lagged dependent variable. This being
our preferred specification, we reject the null hypothesis of zero impact at the 10% level for both
measures of OD: exposure to CLTS resulted in a reduction in OD by 3pp.
Due to possible divestment in toilet maintenance, as discussed in section 2.4, or short-lived
behavioral changes in OD, CLTS impacts may not be sustained over time. We thus investigate
time dynamics in impacts, considering impacts estimates approximately 8 (FU1), 24 (FU2), and 32
(FU3) months after CLTS implementation. Panel B of Table 3 reveals that point estimates are of
similar magnitude throughout the period of study, and are statistically significant for the first and
second followup waves. These estimates point towards a short-run reduction in OD eight months
after CLTS. This reduction is sustained over two years after said intervention implementation, but
then fades out.
4.2 Heterogeneous impacts across communities
CLTS is designed and implemented as a participatory intervention at the community-level, with the
aim of bringing about collective change. This raises the question of whether community character-
istics hinder or foster intervention effectiveness. In spite of its current popularity, there is still scant
experimental evidence where and under which conditions CLTS works. If CLTS is more (or only)
effective in certain settings, successful targeting requires an understanding of the characteristics
that best predict its effectiveness.
The CLTS Handbook, a practitioners’ guide drawing on field experience from 16 countries,
suggests that the impact of CLTS on sanitation outcomes may depend on the socio-economic status
(SES) of treated communities (Kar and Chambers, 2008). It posits that successful implementation
of CLTS is more likely in rural communities that are small, culturally and socially homogeneous,
are located in remote areas and have a high prevalence of OD. In addition, Cameron et al. (2019)
emphasize communities’ social capital as a key facilitator for CLTS impact. Studies in the field of
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experimental economics have drawn similar conclusions, highlighting the importance of community
rather than individual level differences in determinants of variations in concepts such as fairness
and altruism (Henrich et al., 2001, 2006), a conclusion made also in the context of Nigeria (Gowdy
et al., 2003).
Following these hypotheses, we define four broad indicators of local socio-economic status that
may mediate CLTS impacts. In Section 2.4, we introduced community wealth as a widely available,
comprehensive proxy for local socio-economic status (SES). We explore whether CLTS impacts
vary by this SES proxy as well as using three additional proxy measures: i) night light intensity,
ii) population density, and iii) isolation.22
The pairwise correlations between the four characteristics demonstrate that poor communities,
i.e. those below median wealth, are indeed often remote, less densely populated and have lower
night light activity (see Table 4). However, some pairwise correlations are relatively low, suggesting
that each measure may capture a different aspect of socio-economic conditions. For instance, while
population density and isolation appear to be highly correlated (rho = -0.58), the correlation
between community asset wealth and average night light intensity is lower (rho = 0.16).23
Table 4
Pairwise correlations of community level SES measures
SES measures Asset wealth Night lights Density Isolation Toilet coverage
Asset wealth 1 - - - -
Night lights 0.1579 1 - - -
Density 0.2524 0.4519 1 - -
Isolation -0.3434 -0.4871 -0.5762 1 -
Toilet coverage 0.5459 0.2211 0.3523 -0.3273 1
Number of communities 247
Notes: Pairwise correlations of our four alternative measures for community SES. Details on how
we construct these measures can be found in Appendix A.
Additionally, we test whether communities with low baseline toilet coverage are more susceptible
to CLTS for two reasons: first, in these communities, the adjustment margin is higher, and second,
relative utility concerns may prompt higher sanitation investments in these areas. As expected,
Table 4 shows that higher levels of SES measures are correlated with greater toilet coverage at the
22 Details on all four measures are available in Appendix A.2.
23 Note that the inverse relationship between isolation and density reflects that higher population density is asso-
ciated with shorter distances to the nearest LGA capital.
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community level.
Table 5 presents the heterogeneous impact estimates, expressed as percentage point changes
in OD, calculated using the pooled sample. The outcome variable captures the main respondent’s
OD practice, as this outcome is measured in all survey waves. Each column presents heterogeneous
impacts by one of the four community-level SES measures and baseline toilet coverage, which we
discretize along the sample median. For example, in column 1 we rank communities according
to their wealth score. Communities with wealth scores equal to or above the median are defined
as ‘High asset wealth’ communities (CCc = 0), while the rest are classified as ‘Low asset wealth’
communities (CCc = 1). The table shows the regression estimates for γr and γd from specification
2, as well as for the linear combination of both, for comparison purposes.
Table 5
Community economic conditions and CLTS impacts on OD
Dep. variable: main respondent performs OD
Community Characteristic (CC) at BL: Asset wealth Night lights Density Isolation Toilet coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CLTS × High (γr) 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
p-value (naive) (0.50) (0.86) (0.73) (0.01) (0.50)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.93] [0.93] [0.93] [0.05] [0.93]
CLTS × Low (γr + γd) -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.05
p-value (naive) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.98) (0.09)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.02] [0.06] [0.03] [0.98] (0.42)
Difference (γd) -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 0.07 -0.04
p-value (naive) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.26)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.04] [0.24] [0.10] [0.26] (0.92)
DV control mean (EL, High) 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.57 0.34
DV control mean (EL, Low) 0.62 0.57 0.57 0.40 0.66
No. of TUs 246 246 246 246 246
No. of obs. 12,697 12,697 12,697 12,697 12,697
Notes: All specifications control for the household and household head characteristics listed in Table 3. Errors
are clustered at the community level. Naive (unadjusted) p-values shown in parenthesis. In brackets we present
p-values adjusted by family wise error rate following Romano and Wolf (2005), using 1,000 cluster bootstrap
samples and estimated jointly for all regressions presented in Tables 5, 8 and 9.
Table 5 shows strikingly consistent heterogeneous CLTS impacts for our four proxy measures
of community SES. CLTS reduced OD prevalence by 7-9pp in communities with low asset wealth,
low night light intensity, low density of households, or in communities that are far away from
administrative capitals (i.e. high isolation, note the scale reversal here). Impact point estimates in
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these communities are two to three times as large as those found on average (Table 3) and remain
statistically significant at endline. In contrast, we find statistically insignificant impact estimates
close to zero in richer communities, regardless of whether we proxy these by asset wealth, night
light intensity, density or isolation (see first row, columns 1-3 and second row, column 4).
The third row of Table 5 presents the point estimates for the difference in CLTS impacts
between the two halves of the sample, i.e. the estimated parameter γd in Equation (2). We reject
the hypothesis that CLTS had the same impact on communities below and above the median for
wealth, and find that the difference in CLTS impacts between poor and rich communities was 10pp
(see column 1). Similarly, we reject it for all SES measures according to naive p-values at the 5%
level or lower. Using multiple hypothesis testing, we reject it for wealth and, marginally, for density.
These results suggest that CLTS was indeed effective in a sub-sample of communities that shared
underlying characteristics related to low SES.
Asset wealth is highly correlated with toilet coverage at baseline. One possible explanation
for our findings in columns 1-4 of Table 5 could therefore be that we are picking up differences in
initial toilet coverage, and that the latter is the more relevant dimension of CLTS heterogeneity.
This does not seem to be the case. In column 5 we find that the impact of CLTS on OD is 4pp
stronger in areas with low initial toilet coverage areas. This is smaller than what we found using
any of the SES proxies and is not significantly different from zero. Hence, the four SES proxies,
in particular asset wealth, are a more informative measure to understand CLTS effectiveness than
toilet coverage.
The significant impact on OD behavior in poor communities might be driven by either a direct
change in sanitation behavior, i.e. toilet usage, or by an increase in sanitation investments. Using
the detailed measures of toilet stock, flow and quality, described in section 2.4, we break down
sanitation investments into two components. First, CLTS may have promoted investment in new
toilets, increasing toilet coverage (and its usage). Second, households who owned toilets at baseline
may have invested more heavily into their maintenance and upkeep. This would increase the stock
of functioning toilets, reducing the depreciation of the stock of toilets.
CLTS may also have changed sanitation behavior directly, either through increased toilet usage
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conditional on ownership, or through an increase in shared usage, i.e. when the main respondent
declares to use a shared toilet (e.g. owned by a neighbor, public toilet or toilet at school or work).
Table 6
CLTS impacts on toilet ownership and usage
Outcome =1 if: Owns toilet Owns functioning toilet Usage (if functioning) Shared use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A - Pooled impacts
CLTS (γ) 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01
p-value (naive) (0.25) (0.07) (0.83) (0.25)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.55] [0.21] [0.83] [0.55]
Panel B - By community wealth group
CLTS x Rich (γr) -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
p-value (naive) (0.10) (0.25) (0.41) (0.02)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.23] [0.42] [0.42] [0.07]
CLTS x Poor (γr + γd) 0.08 0.10 0.03 -0.00
p-value (naive) 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.99
p-value (MHT robust) [0.01] [0.01] [0.31] [0.99]
Difference (γd) 0.11 0.12 0.05 -0.02
p-value (naive) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.37)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.01] [0.01] [0.20] [0.37]
DV control mean (EL, Rich) 0.47 0.46 0.57 0.04
DV control mean (EL, Poor) 0.24 0.24 0.44 0.02
No. of communities 246 246 245 246
No. of observations 12,497 12,497 7,113 12,697
Notes: All specifications control for the household and household head characteristics listed in Table 3. p-values
are shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the community level and are adjusted for family-wise
error rate following Romano and Wolf (2005), using 1,000 cluster bootstrap samples.
Table 6 presents impact estimates on sanitation investment and shared usage, showing pooled
results in Panel A and heterogeneous impact estimates in Panel B. The reduction by 9pp in OD
observed in poor communities (i.e. communities with low asset wealth in Table 5) is almost identi-
cally matched in column 1 by an increase in toilet ownership of 8pp, suggesting an increase in the
stock of toilets. Ownership of functioning toilets, i.e. maintained stock, increased by 10pp. These
results strongly suggest that the change in sanitation behavior is driven by increased sanitation
investment, mainly due to an increase in the toilet stock (see column 2).24
24 To conduct further sensitivity analysis for potential measurement error in toilet ownership, we estimate a
probit model of selective inspection consent by community and household characteristics. We find that if anything,
measurement error would bias differences between poor and rich communities towards zero: richer households and
households in richer communities are more likely to refuse consent, increasing the possibility of over-reporting of
21
Figure 3
CLTS treatment effects on OD and toilet ownership over time
Note: Graphs plot the point estimates for CLTS impacts by follow up survey wave and community level wealth.
Results for the whole sample from the leftmost plot are equivalent to those presented in column 6 of Table 3. All
specifications control for the household and household head characteristics listed in Table 3. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the community level.
In contrast, usage of existing toilets (column 3) and shared usage (column 4) in poor commu-
nities increased by much less or not at all - the differential impact of CLTS by community wealth
is not statistically significant. Appendix C.3 shows that these results are robust to using the three
alternative measures of communities’ socio-economic status. In sum, OD reductions brought about
by CLTS were due almost exclusively to increases in toilet ownership. Usage of owned toilets was
high, around 80% (p-value 0.19), and not statistically different between the ones that had a toilet
already at baseline and those that built a toilet after the baseline data collection.
ownership in this group. Critically, there are no differences in refusal rates between treatment and control groups,
even when split by wealth levels. In addition, we test the robustness of our estimates by restricting the analysis to
households that give inspection consent, and find that our results above are virtually unchanged.
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Figure 3 shows dynamic CLTS impacts on toilet ownership and open defecation practice in poor
and rich communities up to 32 months after the baseline survey. CLTS reduced OD in the short-run
in poorer communities, and impacts were sustained over time (light blue). The estimated short-
and long-run impacts of CLTS on both OD (see left panel) and toilet ownership (right panel) across
the three followup periods are remarkably constant in poor communities. We draw two conclusions:
First, our interpretation that CLTS-induced OD reductions are realized through increased toilet
ownership holds also in the dynamic context. This suggests that CLTS has had a persistent effect
on OD in poor communities through toilet uptake, akin to that of a one-shot policy. Yet, given
the strong link between toilet investment and improved sanitation behavior, CLTS impact in poor
communities is achieved in the short-and sustained in the long-run.
4.3 The role of community wealth: robustness
In this section we conduct a number of robustness checks on our heterogeneous impact finding that
wealth is a policy relevant margin for CLTS effectiveness.
4.3.1 Functional form
We presented above differential impacts based on a discrete split into rich and poor communities.
While using median values as cut-off is a relatively standard approach, our results are qualitatively
and quantitatively robust to alternative functional forms. Using for example a linear specification of
community wealth rather than the discrete split into rich and poor communities, we find that treated
communities that are one standard deviation poorer than the median display a 10% reduction in
OD (detailed results in Appendix C). Similarly, using quartiles of community asset wealth, we find
that CLTS impacts are statistically significant and decreasing by wealth quartile (Figure 4). They
are statistically significant up to median wealth, for higher quartiles the treatment effects is zero.
4.3.2 Community versus household level heterogeneity
Our measure of community asset wealth is an aggregation of household level information. Richer
(poorer) communities tend to be composed of richer (poorer) households. Yet, significant het-
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Figure 4
CLTS impacts by community wealth quartile
Note: CLTS treatment effect coefficients by community wealth quartile. All specifications control for household
characteristics listed in Table 3. Errors are clustered at the community level.
erogeneity between household and community wealth remains: 31% of households living in poor
clusters have higher asset wealth than the median, and 34% of the households living in rich clusters
are below median wealth.
To understand whether our estimates are simply capturing that CLTS is (more) effective among
poorer households (rather than poorer communities), we proceed in two ways. First, we run the
same regression presented in column 1 of Table 5 but use a household wealth indicator instead of
the community one. Second, we split the sample to investigate the effects of CLTS on OD for poor
households in rich communities and rich households in poor communities. Appendix C.2 shows
that CLTS is more effective among poorer households than rich ones, but the point estimate of the
difference between rich and poor is about half as large as that of the community wealth impacts
and not statistically significant under multiple hypothesis testing (see Column 1 in Appendix Table
17).25 Furthermore, while in poor communities both rich and poor households reduce OD, there
is no discernible effect nor a difference between poor and rich households in rich communities (see
25 In Table 18, we also show that household composition or education do not explain the impact of CLTS.
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columns 2 and 3 in Appendix Table 17). This suggests that CLTS is more effective in poorer
communities, regardless of the household’s position in the wealth distribution.
4.3.3 Characteristics of poor versus rich communities
Poorer and richer communities may differ along many dimensions that may be relevant for the
effectiveness of a program such as CLTS. In Table 7 we present differences between the two groups
at baseline by social interactions in the community, access to infrastructure and village leader
characteristics.26
The index of social capital appears to be uncorrelated with community wealth. Poor communi-
ties, however, do exhibit higher levels of social cohesion (as measured by community-level trust and
religious fragmentation) and lower levels of asset wealth inequality than rich communities.27 We
also find significant differences in access to public infrastructure, including having a local school,
a hospital and paved internal roads. Finally, poor communities have less experienced and less
educated leaders.
We assess whether any of these dimensions might be the main drivers behind differential CLTS
effectiveness by community wealth. Kar and Chambers (2008) suggest social interactions as a
potential driver and Cameron et al. (2019) find that a CLTS intervention in Indonesia generated
stronger effects in communities with higher social capital. However, results in Table 8 show that the
point estimates, in most cases, go in the opposite direction of what would be expected if stronger
social cohesion improved program effectiveness. For example, we find slightly stronger reductions
in OD in treated communities with lower social capital, high fragmentation and inequality. In all
cases, differences in CLTS effectiveness along dimensions of social interactions are not significantly
different from zero in our study context.
We secondly explore whether our main results could be explained by poorer communities’ lower
access to infrastructure which may, for example, proxy for transport costs. Further, as leaders
are the initial point of contact for the implementers and help organize the CLTS meeting in their
26 We in addition present in the Table what we refer to as ‘Household charactertsics’, the share of households
headed by a male and with children below the age of 6 years. Since these variables do not differ between rich and
poor communities, we do not discuss them further.
27 Details about how these measures are constructed are in appendix A.2.
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Table 7
Baseline characteristics of rich and poor communities
Community wealth group: Rich Poor P-value
Social interactions in the community
Social capital index (mean = 0, SD = 1) 0.117 0.0978 0.88
Trust in neighbours (0-None, 2-High, SD = 0.40) 0.809 0.970 0.00∗∗∗
Religious fragmentation (0-Low, 1-High) 0.642 0.598 0.03∗∗
Asset wealth inequality 0.951 0.612 0.00∗∗∗
Communities’ public infrastructure
Has paved internal roads (%) 57.16 28.91 0.00∗∗∗
Has a local hospital (%) 23.24 3.866 0.00∗∗∗
Has a local primary school (%) 72.53 61.18 0.05∗∗
Village leader characteristics
Years as leader 11.59 9.100 0.04∗∗
Completed primary school (%) 60.42 42.42 0.00∗∗∗
Affiliated to a political party (%) 29.02 33.20 0.47
Household characteristics
Share of HHs with male heads (%) 65.25 62.60 0.19
Share of HHs with children below 6 y/o (%) 29.38 28.70 0.71
Observations 233
Notes: All variables measured at baseline. Sample restricted to households inter-
viewed at baseline and in all three followup survey waves. For a detailed description
of household and community-level covariates, please see Appendix A. *p <0.10,
** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table 8
CLTS impacts on OD by community level social interactions
Dep. variable: main respondent performs OD
Community Characteristic (CC) at BL: Trust Social capital Fragmentation Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS × High (γr) -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05
p-value (naive) (0.11) (0.49) (0.08) (0.10)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.53] [0.93] [0.47] [0.53]
CLTS × Low (γr + γd) -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02
p-value (naive) (0.17) (0.04) (0.30) (0.27)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.60] [0.26] [0.68] [0.68]
Difference (γd) 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.03
p-value (naive) (0.60) (0.25) (0.56) (0.43)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.98] [0.92] [0.98] [0.98]
DV control mean (EL, High) 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.56
DV control mean (EL, Low) 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.41
No. of TUs 246 246 246 246
No. of obs. 12,697 12,697 12,697 12,697
Notes: All specifications control for the household and household head characteristics listed in Table
3. Errors are clustered at the community level. Naive (unadjusted) p-values shown in parenthesis.
In brackets we present p-values adjusted by family wise error rate following Romano and Wolf
(2005), using 1,000 cluster bootstrap samples and estimated jointly for all regressions presented in
Tables 5, 8 and 9.
village, leaders’ tenure and education may play an important role. We find no heterogeneous CLTS
impacts along either of the three indicators of public infrastructure (columns 1-3, Table 9) nor
along the village leader’s tenure or education (columns 4 and 5, Table 9).
4.3.4 Implementation heterogeneity
CLTS is a fairly standardized intervention. Nonetheless, there is the possibility that the heteroge-
neous impacts we observe are the result of differences in the intervention’s delivery. In recent work
based on the same RCT, Abramovsky et al. (2016) show that CLTS triggering meetings are more
likely to fail, and not be carried out at all, in areas with high population density which is positively
correlated with community wealth. Is CLTS ineffective in rich communities because CLTS trigger-
ing meetings are not taking place? Using community wealth directly, we find that the difference
in triggering rates is small. The share of communities assigned to CLTS in which CLTS trigger-
ing meetings were successfully run was 75% for rich communities, and 83% in poor communities.
These rates are not significantly different from each other at standard levels of statistical confidence
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Table 9
CLTS impacts on OD by community infrastructure and village leader characteristics
Dep. variable: main respondent performs OD
Public goods Leader
Community Characteristic (CC) at BL: Road Hospital School Experience Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CLTS × Yes/High (γr) -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
p-value (naive) (0.43) (0.06) (0.20) (0.09) (0.23)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.93] [0.31] [0.74] [0.49] [0.77]
CLTS × No/Low (γr + γd) -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
p-value (naive) (0.01) (0.85) (0.11) (0.17) (0.08)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.12] [0.98] [0.51] [0.60] [0.40]
Difference (γd) -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01
p-value (naive) (0.24) (0.43) (0.78) (0.89) (0.65)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.92] [0.98] [0.98] [0.98] [0.98]
DV control mean (EL, High) 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.53
DV control mean (EL, Low) 0.45 0.40 0.48 0.46 0.43
No. of TUs 235 233 235 232 232
No. of obs. 11,901 11,793 11,901 11,619 11,692
Notes: All specifications control for the household and household head characteristics listed in Table
3. Errors are clustered at the community level. Naive (unadjusted) p-values shown in parenthesis. In
brackets we present p-values adjusted by family wise error rate following Romano and Wolf (2005),
using 1,000 cluster bootstrap samples and estimated jointly for all regressions presented in Tables 5,
8 and 9.
(p-value=0.301). In addition, we present in B estimates of the impact of CLTS, instrumented by
treatment assignment, and find very similar results to the ITT estimates.
Differences in delivery (and hence impacts) may also arise if meeting attendance rates are
higher in poor communities. We do not find evidence for this hypothesis either. Attendance rates,
measured as the number of attendees recorded by CLTS facilitators over village population, were
not significantly different between rich and poor communities.28
Differences in the quality of CLTS delivery may also arise from different delivery agents. As
described in Section 2.2, WaterAid hired two NGOs with CLTS experience, one from each state, to
train local government officials in the facilitation of CLTS meetings. If these intermediate delivery
agents (the NGOs) differed in the quality of their training activities, we might observe state-level
28 On average, 34% of the village members attended CLTS meetings in rich communities, while 42% attended in
poor communities. A community level regression of attendance rates on community level wealth group (i.e. a dummy
equal to one if the community is poor) and LGA fixed effects results in a point estimate of just 3pp and a p-value of
0.662. Results are available upon request.
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differences in CLTS effectiveness.29 We find no evidence of this (see Appendix B). Interacting
treatment status with state dummies in a specification similar to Equation (2), we find that the
interaction term is small and not significantly different from zero (p-value=0.326).
4.4 Summary of findings
Taken together, our results suggest that community wealth encompasses a number of community
characteristics that made CLTS more effective. We did not find evidence that any of these char-
acteristics (such as toilet coverage, implementation or measures of social cohesion) could explain
independently why CLTS worked better in poorer communities.
While the available data does not allow us to pin down the drivers of these differential impacts,
the heterogeneity dimension is in line with CLTS originators’ theory and practitioners’ experiences
as to where the intervention should work best. The importance of context for CLTS effectiveness
was also highlighted in a recent cross-country study, which concludes that ‘[t]he impact of CLTS and
subsequent sustained latrine use varied more by region than by intervention, indicating that context
may be as or more important than the implementation approach in determining effectiveness’
(Crocker et al., 2017a).
In line with this observation, we will show in the next section that even without a context-
specific understanding of underlying mechanisms, our heterogeneous CLTS impact can be used as
a basis for more effective targeting of the intervention —both within Nigeria and beyond. In other
words, we will show that community wealth (or a proxy) is a precise predictor of CLTS effectiveness
and can be used for policy targeting.
5 Intervention targeting and transferability
It is widely advocated that decisions about investment in public health interventions should be
evidence-based. Due to the high cost of producing location-specific evidence, policy decisions
are usually based on a limited number of studies, often conducted elsewhere. Their results are
generalized to make an implementation decision in a different set of target sites. This is despite the
29 Of course, this is not the only channel that could explain differential results by state.
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understanding that the outcome of such interventions depends on both the interventions themselves
and the context in which they are implemented (Meager, 2019, Wang et al., 2006). Or, as Angrist
(2004) put it ‘[t]he relevance or ’external validity’ of a particular set of empirical results is always
an open question.’ Recent reviews of RCT impact evaluation studies, in the medical (Malmivaara,
2019) as well as the development economics literature (Peters et al., 2018), highlight that their
external validity may be limited.
Context-specific impacts may arise due to heterogeneous responses of population subgroups
which lead to diverging average treatment impacts across RCTs that sample (randomly) from
populations with different underlying characteristics. A better understanding of heterogeneous
responses could help strengthen the generalizability and external validity of RCTs to different
target populations (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2012, Ferraro and Miranda, 2013, Hotz et al., 2005,
Imai and Ratkovic, 2013). Policy makers can then use such evidence to more cost effectively target
interventions to responsive subgroups (Djebbari and Smith, 2008, Heckman et al., 1997).
We argue, in the same spirit, that policy-makers in Nigeria and in other countries can build on
our findings, target poor geographical areas and, by doing so, avoid wasting money on implementing
CLTS in low or no response communities. This is particularly relevant given recent estimates that
’the true costs of participatory sanitation’ (Crocker et al., 2017b), can be quite substantial. At the
same time, the large range of existing cost estimates between US$30.34-81.56 per targeted household
in Ghana, and US$14.15-19.21 in Ethiopia suggests that there may be scope for streamlining its
implementation. We explore the external validity of our results in other contexts in the next section.
5.1 Community wealth as a factor reconciling diverging CLTS RCT results
Developed in Bangladesh in 1999, CLTS is today widely implemented and endorsed by governments
and NGOs in more than 25 Latin American, Asian and African countries. Given limited evidence on
its effectiveness in the initial phase (Venkataramanan et al., 2018), its spread was typically a reaction
to enthusiastic advocacy by numerous actors, including grassroot activists, state bureaucrats and
the donor community.
Rigorous evaluation studies emerged only from the early 2010s. Yet, even if policy-makers
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today were to base CLTS implementation decisions on the available RCT findings, the conflicting
impact estimates would not be a useful guide. To the best of our knowledge, five other studies
have estimated the impact of CLTS-like interventions in developing countries based on RCTs.
The World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP) conducted three of these studies,
in Tanzania (Briceno et al., 2017), Madhya Pradesh, India (Patil et al., 2014), and East Java,
Indonesia (Cameron et al., 2019). Pickering et al. (2015) conducted a similar evaluation in rural
Mali. Finally, Guiteras et al. (2015) carried out a cluster RCT in Tanore, Bangladesh, in which
they evaluated the impact of three different policy approaches, one of which was a CLTS-style
intervention.30 These studies have produced inconclusive results on the impact of CLTS. Results
range from 30pp increases in toilet ownership in Mali to no statistically-detectable impacts in the
studies conducted in Bangladesh and Indonesia.
In this section, we argue that community-level SES, in particular wealth, might be the factor
underlying these diverging results. In Section 4, we documented the strong heterogeneity of CLTS
impacts by community wealth in our field experiment in Nigeria. If these results are externally
valid, CLTS interventions in richer areas will generally have lower (or no detectable) impact than
those administered in poorer areas.
Using study-specific data, we analyze how CLTS effectiveness across (and within) RCTs varied
along low SES status. We conduct this comparison exercise in two steps. First, we employ the
datasets used in each study to estimate impacts for each study based on a consistent method.31
While our preferred specification is ANCOVA with household level controls, other studies relied on
simple-differences or first-differences estimates.
The estimable specification based on information that is jointly available across studies is a
relatively parsimonious ANCOVA. For each study, including our own, we estimate CLTS impacts
30 The other two were supply side technical assistance and subsidy provision.
31 The datasets for the studies conducted in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Tanzania were made publicly
available by the authors of the studies. They can be found at: Guiteras et al. (2017) (Bangladesh), Water and
Sanitation Program and Network for Engineering and Economics Research and Management (2009) (India), Water
and Sanitation Program (2008) (Indonesia), and Briceno et al. (2012) (Tanzania).
31
using the following regression model:32
yicd = α+ γ Tcd + θ yicd0 +Xicd β + ωd + icd (3)
The outcome variables yicd, are ownership of a private, functioning toilet and whether any
member of the household performs OD. Tcd is a dummy variable equal to one if cluster c from
district d has been assigned to CLTS, and zero otherwise.33 We include baseline values yicd0 for the
outcome variables, except for Tanzania, where no baseline data was collected. Our study is the only
one to include multiple post-treatment survey waves, so we restricted our sample to observations
from the second followup wave (FU2), which is closest in timing to the post-intervention surveys of
the other studies. Jointly available household level controls Xicd are gender, age and age squared
of the household head, household size and whether the households’ primary activity is farming. We
include geographic fixed effects (ωd) where appropriate, to account for stratified randomization.34
Standard errors are clustered at the unit of randomization.
The data from the RCT in Mali (Pickering et al. (2015)) is not publicly available, so we use the
estimates presented in their paper, obtained by a means comparison of outcomes between treatment
and control households at endline. The OD outcome selected for this exercise is whether any adult
female performed OD.
Secondly, we need a consistent measure of SES status to compare impact estimates across
studies. While elicited in most household surveys in developing countries, the information on
ownership of consumer durables that we collected for the construction of the community wealth
index is not available for all studies. In addition, the list of durables used to construct asset wealth
indices is highly context-specific (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). Similar limitations rule out the
use of population density and distance to the nearest district headquarters. Data confidentiality
reasons made the exact location of study sites non-disclosable in a majority of the cited studies.
We therefore use average night light intensity indices, measured at the lowest geographical level
32 Datasets are not pooled. We re-estimate study-specific treatment effects following a common specification.
33 In cases where multiple treatment arms existed, we include only the CLTS arm and the control group.
34 District level fixed effects are used to estimate impacts for the case of India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Tanzania.
We omit geographical fixed effects in the case of Bangladesh since the experiment was conducted in a single district.
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available in each study, as a universally available measure of community-level SES. While used in
the past to proxy for GDP per capita at the sub-national level in African countries (Michalopoulos,
2013), we showed that it is a robust proxy for community SES, and yields very similar heterogeneous
impact estimates to those obtained by community wealth (see Table 5).35
Appendix Table 20 gives a detailed overview of the level of geographical disaggregation and
the number of observed geographical units used to calculate average night light intensities. In line
with our analysis in the previous sections, we exploit within-study variation in night light intensity
to calculate treatment effects separately for the poor and richest halves of each sample.36 All
night light indices relate to the baseline survey year.37 As a result, we obtain pairs of night light
intensities and impact estimates for each study (and for most studies separate pairs for the rich
and poor half of geographical units).
In Figure 5, we order study areas by their average night light index (shaded bars, right axis).
We then plot the point estimates for CLTS treatment effects in each study (left axis). For Tanzania,
India, Nigeria and Indonesia, we include our estimates for the richer and poorer halves, and for
the whole sample. Gray markers present the point estimates and confidence intervals for CLTS
treatment effects on OD , black markers illustrate estimates for ownership of a functioning toilet.
As night light intensity increases, point estimates decrease in magnitude for both outcomes,
and the likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis falls. Among the seven samples with the highest
average night light index, statistically detectable impacts were observed in only two cases (i.e. India
(all), and India (rich) for toilet ownership, and Nigeria (all) and Indonesia (rich) for OD). This
is reversed when we look at the seven studies with the lowest night light intensity: statistically
significant impacts are detected in all but two cases, and for both outcomes. We can confirm this
finding by plotting the point estimates from each sample with respect to the logarithm of their night
light index, as done in Figure 6. The Spearman correlation index between CLTS point estimates
and log night light intensity is -0.46 for the case of toilet ownership, and 0.64 for the case of OD,
with the latter being statistically significant at the 5% level.
35 Michalopoulos (2013) also present evidence of a strong correlation between wealth and night light intensity.
36 See appendix E for full details and exceptions where this procedure was not possible due to data limitations.
37 In Tanzania, no baseline measure was taken in 2009 due to challenges in the field. We nevertheless used the
corresponding night light intensity measure from 2009.
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Figure 5
CLTS impacts on OD and toilet ownership by average night light intensity
Note: Study-specific point estimates from a simple differences regression of CLTS impacts on OD prevalence (gray
squares) and toilet ownership (black dots). Gray bars show the average night light intensity recorded by NASA’s
Operational Line Scan (OLS) system, on the year of each study’s baseline survey, over the study area. Data from
the Mali study was unavailable, so results from Table 2 from Pickering et al. (2015) were used instead (in the case of
OD, results for adult women were used).
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Figure 6
CLTS treatment effects by night light intensity over study area
(a) Toilet ownership (b) Open defecation
Note: Figures plot CLTS average treatment effects on toilet ownership (Panel a) and OD rates (Panel b), from each
(sub)sample in Figure 5. The horizontal axis is the logarithm of night light intensity over each study area during
baseline.
We thus argue that the large range of CLTS impacts across studies can be rationalized by
differences in the average wealth (measured through night light) of the area in which they were
conducted.38 Amore detailed analysis would require access to the exact locations of the observations
in each study or more detailed data regarding household ownership of consumer durables (both
unavailable), that could then be combined to separately identify cross-study variation from genuine
observational differences across households as, for example, proposed by Meager (2019).
Once again we check whether the cross-context relationship between CLTS effectiveness and SES
status might simply be the results of higher treatment effects in areas with lower baseline toilet
coverage. To do so, we repeat the analysis we conducted with nightlight intensity with baseline
sanitation coverage instead.39
Figure 7, which mirrors Figure 5, shows that there is no clear relationship between baseline
38 In a separate exercise, we pooled the five studies for which data was available (i.e. we excluded Mali, where
stronger effects have been found) and extracted average night light intensity at the second administrative level
(districts). We included an interaction term between T and the measure of night light at the district level in equation
3, and found that CLTS increases toilet ownership (coefficient 0.092, p-value 0.001) and reduces open defecation
(coefficient -0.080, p-value 0.007). As suggested in Figure 5, the treatment effect is slightly lower in areas with higher
night light intensity, as observed in the coefficient on the interaction term, for both toilet ownership (coefficient -0.015,
p-value 0.072) and open defecation decreases (coefficient 0.010, p-value 0.220). These results are only suggestive, but
are consistent with our findings.
39 No data was collected at baseline in the trial conducted in Tanzania, so endline toilet ownership and OD rates
among the control group are used instead.
35
Figure 7
CLTS impacts on OD and toilet ownership by average toilet ownership at baseline
Note: Study-specific point estimates from a simple differences regression of CLTS impacts on OD prevalence (gray
squares) and toilet ownership (black dots). Gray bars show the average toilet ownership rates, at baseline, of each
study sample. No baseline data was collected in the case of Tanzania, so ownership rates from the control group
measured at endline were used instead.
toilet coverage and CLTS treatment effects, suggesting that - in line with our findings for Nigeria -
the gradient in CLTS treatment effects along the night light intensity dimension is unlikely driven
by pre-existing differences in toilet ownership at baseline across contexts.
We confirm this finding again by plotting the point estimates from each sample with respect
to the logarithm of their baseline toilet ownership coverage rates (Figure 8). Compared to the
Spearman Correlation index with nightlight intensity, the correlation indices for toilet coverage
become smaller in magnitude (-0.36 and -0.18), lose statistical significance, and the explained
variation in each plot falls strongly.
Our comparison analysis suggests that the key result of our field experiment - that CLTS impacts
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Figure 8
CLTS treatment effects by toilet ownership of study area
(a) Toilet ownership (b) Open defecation
Note: Figures plot CLTS average treatment effects on toilet ownership (Panel a) and OD rates (Panel b), from each
(sub)sample in Figure 5. The horizontal axis is the average toilet ownership rate in each study area during baseline.
are larger in magnitude (or non-zero) in poorer areas - extends to other contexts. In other words,
community characteristics matter.
5.2 Policy Implications
The implications of our findings are self-evident: Governments with restricted funds may achieve
larger improvements in sanitation if they use an effective targeting strategy and such a strategy
can be based on a measure of community wealth.
We argue that available surveys such as the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), or satellite
nightlight intensity, both of which are available for all of the 60 countries across continents where
CLTS is widely implemented, can form the basis of such a targeting strategy.
In Appendix D, we demonstrate in detail how such data can be used for CLTS targeting in the
case of Nigeria. We develop a targeting strategy based on our impact estimates from the Nigerian
RCT and the 2013 Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey. Even though the DHS contains a less
detailed list of assets than our data, the simpler DHS index of community wealth strongly predicts
the more sophisticated measure of community wealth used in our study, supporting the notion that
readily available surveys collecting asset wealth information, such as the Demographic and Health
Survey, are well-suited for CLTS targeting. The resulting targeting map in Figure 9 highlights
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priority areas for targeting, i.e. poor areas where toilet ownership rates are low, in darker shaded
areas.
Figure 9
CLTS targeting in Nigeria
Source: Own calculations based on DHS Nigeria 2013.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The design of effective policies to address the urgent sanitation concerns in the developing world re-
quires a nuanced understanding of households’ investment choices and drivers of behavioral change.
In this paper we provide evidence on the effectiveness of Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS),
a participatory information intervention widely implemented around the world.
Our study uses a large cluster randomized experiment in Nigeria for which we collected data
up to three years after treatment. Implementation of CLTS was conducted at-scale, i.e. by WASH
civil servants trained by local NGOs. We show that CLTS, a participatory community intervention
without financial components, had positive but moderate effects on open defecation and toilet
construction overall. However, average impacts hide important heterogeneity by communities’
socio-economic status, as the intervention has strong and lasting effects on open defecation habits
in poorer communities, and increases sanitation investments. In poor communities, OD rates
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decreased by 9pp from a baseline level of 75%, while we find no effect in richer communities. The
reduction in OD is achieved mainly through increased toilet ownership (+8pp from a baseline level of
24%). While this result is robust across several measures of community socio-economic status, and
is not driven by baseline differences in toilet coverage, our data does not allow us to pin down why
households in poorer communities are more susceptible to the programme. However, in addition to
the more effective targeting strategies, highlighted in the previous section, that governments can
adopt, our results have three further important implications.
First, our results provide an additional reason why scale-up of interventions is not trivial (Baner-
jee et al., 2017a, Bold et al., 2013, Deaton and Cartwright, 2018, Ravallion, 2012). Discussions on
why interventions may not scale-up successfully in a national roll-out have focused on general
equilibrium and spillover effects, and recently on aspects of implementation and delivery. The lit-
erature has suggested that spillovers and moderating general equilibrium effects may lead to lower
returns to interventions, when interventions conducted in areas with specific characteristics are
being rolled out universally, e.g. in richer areas. We show that community-specific, heterogeneous
treatment impacts are an additional impediment to successful scale-up in terms of effectiveness of
interventions.
Second, community SES also provides plausible external validity beyond our Nigerian-based
RCT. Using data from our study and five other RCTs of similar interventions, we find an inverse
relationship between area-level wealth, measured by night light intensity, and program effectiveness
across these studies. Thus, we have identified a characteristic that rationalizes the wide range of
impact estimates in the literature.
Last but not least, we show that interventions relying on information and collective action mech-
anisms can have substantial impacts on households’ health investments and behaviour, specifically
relating to sanitation. Yet , there is an important caveat for policy-makers working towards meet-
ing the sanitation-related sustainable development goals. CLTS achieves convergence between poor
and rich communities in terms of OD and toilet coverage in our study - and thus levels the playing
field. However, it is not a silver bullet to achieve open defecation free status in poor communities.
Hence, more research on alternative or supplementary interventions to close the sanitation gap in
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low income countries is needed. These may either seek to magnify CLTS impacts (e.g. through
complementary financial incentives, loans or subsidies or more intensive followup), or improve sani-
tation in rich communities where CLTS is ineffective, e.g. via infrastructure investment and supply
side interventions.
THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES
THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES
ROYAL HOLLOWAY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES
INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
ROYAL HOLLOWAY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES
40
References
Abramovsky, L., Augsburg, B., Flynn, E., and Oteiza, F. (2016). Improving CLTS targeting:
Evidence from Nigeria. Technical Report IFS Briefing Note BN183, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Abramovsky, L., Augsburg, B., and Oteiza, F. (2015). Baseline report: Sustainable Total Sanitation
- Nigeria. Technical report, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Abramovsky, L., Augsburg, B., Oteiza, F., and IPC (2018). Sustainable Total Sanitation - Nigeria:
Final Research Report. Technical report, The Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Adukia, A. (2017). Sanitation and education. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
9(2):23–59.
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., and Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 114(4):1243–1284.
Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2002). Who trusts others? Journal of Public Economics, 85(2):207–
234.
Allcott, H. and Mullainathan, S. (2012). External validity and partner selection bias. NBER
Working Paper 18373.
Alsan, M. and Goldin, C. (2019). Watersheds in child mortality: The role of effective water and
sewerage infrastructure, 1880-1920. Journal of Political Economy, 127(2):586–638.
Alzua, M. L., Djebbari, H., and Pickering, A. J. (2018). A Community Based Program Promotes
Sanitation. CEDLAS WP 228.
Angrist, J. (2004). Treatment effect heterogeneity in theory and practice. The Economic Journal,
114(494):C52–C83.
Angrist, J. D. and Imbens, G. W. (1995). Two-stage least squares estimation of average causal effects
in models with variable treatment intensity. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
90(430):431–442.
41
Augsburg, B. and Rodriguez-Lesmes, P. A. (2018). Sanitation and child health in India. World
Development, 107:22–39.
Baird, S., Hicks, J. H., Kremer, M., and Miguel, E. (2016). Worms at Work: Long-run Impacts of
a Child Health Investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4):1637–1680.
Bandiera, O., Burgess, R., Deserrano, E., Rasul, I., and Sulaiman, M. (2018). Social Ties, Identity
and the Delivery of Public Services. Working paper.
Banerjee, A., Banerji, R., Berry, J., Duflo, E., Kannan, H., Mukherji, S., Shotland, M., and
Walton, M. (2017a). From proof of concept to scalable policies: Challenges and solutions, with
an application. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(4):73–102.
Banerjee, A., Chassang, S., and Snowberg, E. (2017b). Handbook of Field Experiments - Volume
1. chapter 4 - Decision Theoretic Approaches to Experiment Design and External Validity. North
Holland, Elsevier.
Basu, K. (2014). Randomisation, causality and the role of reasoned intuition. Oxford Development
Studies, 42(2):455–72.
Bold, T., Kimenyi, M., Mwabu, G., Ng’ang’a, A., and Sandefur, J. (2013). Scaling up what works:
Experimental evidence on external validity in Kenyan education. CGD Working Paper 321.
Briceno, B., Coville, A., Gertler, P., and Martinez, S. (2017). Are there synergies from combining
hygiene and sanitation promotion campaigns: Evidence from a large-scale cluster-randomized
trial in rural Tanzania. PLoS One, 12(11):e0186228.
Briceno, B., Coville, A., and Martinez, S. (2012). Impact Evaluation of Scaling-up Handwashing
and Rural Sanitation Behavior Projects in Tanzania 2012, Endline Survey (SHRSBIE-EL). Ref.
TZA_2012_SHRSBIE-EL_v01_M_v01_A_PUF.
Briceno, B., Coville, A., and Martinez, S. (2015). Promoting handwashing and sanitation: evidence
from a large-scale randomized trial in rural Tanzania. Policy Research Working Paper - World
Bank, 7164(WPS7164):58–pp.
42
Cameron, L., Olivia, S., and Shah, M. (2019). Scaling up sanitation: Evidence from an RCT in
Indonesia. Journal of Development Economics, 138:1 – 16.
Crocker, J., Saywell, D., and Bartram, J. (2017a). Sustainability of community-led total sani-
tation outcomes: Evidence from Ethiopia and Ghana. International Journal of Hygiene and
Environmental Health, 220(3):551–557.
Crocker, J., Saywell, D., Shields, K., Kolsky, P., and Bartram, J. (2017b). The true costs of
participatory sanitation: Evidence from community-led total sanitation studies in Ghana and
Ethiopia. The Science of the Total Environment, (601–602):1075–1083.
Cunha, J. M., De Giorgi, G., and Jayachandran, S. (2018). The price effects of cash versus in-kind
transfers. The Review of Economic Studies, 86(1):240–281.
Deaton, A. and Cartwright, N. (2018). Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled
trials. Social Science & Medicine, 210:2–21.
Djebbari, H. and Smith, J. (2008). Heterogeneous impacts in progresa. Journal of Econometrics,
145:64–80.
Dupas, P. (2011). Health Behavior in Developing Countries. Annual Review of Economics, 3(1):425–
449.
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112(4):1203–1250.
Ferraro, P. and Miranda, J. (2013). Heterogeneous treatment effects and mechanisms in
information-based environmental policies: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. Resource
and Energy Economics, 35:356–379.
Filmer, D. and Pritchett, L. (2001). Estimating Wealth Effects Without Expenditure Data–Or
Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in States of India. Demography, 38(1):115–
132.
43
Gowdy, J., Iorgulescu, R., and Onyeiwu, S. (2003). Fairness and retaliation in a rural Nigerian
village. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 52:469–479.
Guiteras, R., Levinsohn, J., and Mobarak, A. M. (2015). Sanitation subsidies. Encouraging sanita-
tion investment in the developing world: a cluster-randomized trial. Science, 348(6237):903–906.
Guiteras, R., Levinsohn, J., and Mobarak, A. M. (2017). Encouraging Sanitation Investment in
the Developing World: A Cluster-Randomized Trial - Dataset. Harvard Dataverse.
Heckman, J., Smith, J., and Clements, N. (1997). Making the most out of programme evaluations
and social experiments: accounting for heterogeneity in programme impacts. Review of Economic
Studies, 64:487–535.
Henderson, J. V., Storeygard, A., and Weil, D. N. (2012). Measuring economic growth from outer
space. American Economic Review, 102(2):994–1028.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., and McElreath, R. (2001).
In search of homo economics: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American
Economic Review, 91:73–78.
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J.,
Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., and Ziker, J.
(2006). Costly punishment across human societies. Science, 321:1767–1770.
Hotz, J., Imbens, G., and Mortimer, J. (2005). Predicting the efficacy of future training programs
using past experiences at other locations. Journal of Econometrics, 125:241–270.
Imai, K. and Ratkovic, M. (2013). Estimating treatment effect heterogeneity in randomized program
evaluation. Annals of Applied Statistics, 7(1):443–47.
Imbens, G. W. and Angrist, J. D. (1994). Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment
Effects. Econometrica, 62(2):467–475.
Kar, K. (2003). Subsidy or self-respect? Participatory total community sanitation in Bangladesh.
IDS Working Paper.
44
Kar, K. and Chambers, R. (2008). Handbook on Community-Led Total Sanitation, volume 44.
Institute of Development Studies.
Malmivaara, A. (2019). Generalizability of findings from randomized controlled trials is limited in
the leading general medical journals. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 107:36–41.
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3):681–712.
McKenzie, D. (2012). Beyond baseline and follow-up: The case for more T in experiments. Journal
of Development Economics, 99(2):210–221.
McKenzie, D. J. (2005). Measuring inequality with asset indicators. Journal of Population Eco-
nomics, 18(2):229–260.
Meager, R. (2019). Understanding the average impact of microcredit expansions: A Bayesian
hierarchical analysis of seven randomized experiments. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, 11(1):57–91.
Michalopoulos, S. E. P. (2013). Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African devel-
opment. Econometrica, 81(1):113–152.
Miller, G. and Mobarak, A. M. (2013). Gender Differences in Preferences, Intra-Household Ex-
ternalities, and Low Demand for Improved Cookstoves. Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Muralidharan, K. and Niehaus, P. (2017). Experimentation at scale. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 31(4):103–24.
Patil, S. R., Arnold, B. F., Salvatore, A. L., Briceño, B., Ganguly, S., Colford, J. M., and Gertler,
P. J. (2014). The effect of India’s Total Sanitation Campaign on defecation behaviors and
child health in rural Madhya Pradesh: a cluster randomized controlled trial. PLOS Medicine,
11(8):e1001709.
45
Peters, J., Langbein, J., and Roberts, G. (2018). Generalization in the tropics —development
policy, randomized controlled trials, and external validity. The World Bank Research Observer,
33(1):34–64.
Pickering, A. J., Djebbari, H., Lopez, C., Coulibaly, M., and Alzua, M. L. (2015). Effect of a
community-led sanitation intervention on child diarrhoea and child growth in rural Mali: A
cluster-randomised controlled trial. The Lancet Global Health, 3(11):e701–e711.
Prüss-Ustün, A., Bartram, J., Clasen, T., Colford, J. M., Curtis, V., Bonjour, S., Cumming, O.,
Dangour, A. D., Fewtrell, L., France, J. D., Freeman, M., Gordon, B., Hunter, P., Johnston, R. B.,
Medlicott, K., Mäusezahl, D., Mathers, C., Neira, M., Stocks, M., Wolf, J., and Cairncross, S.
(2014). Burden of diarrhoeal disease from water, sanitation and hygiene in low resource settings: a
retrospective analysis of data from 147 countries. Trop Med Int Health (in submission), 19(8):894–
905.
Prüss-Üstün, A. and Corvalán, C. (2006). Preventing disease through healthy environments. To-
wards an estimate of the environmental burden of disease. World Health Organization.
Ravallion, M. (2012). Fighting poverty one experiment at a time: Poor economics: A radical
rethinking of the way to fight global poverty: Review essay. Journal of Economic Literature,
50(1):103–114.
Romano, J. P. and Wolf, M. (2005). Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data snooping. Econo-
metrica, 73(4):1237–1282.
Spears, D. and Lamba, S. (2016). Effects of Early-Life Exposure to Sanitation on Childhood
Cognitive Skills: Evidence from India’s Total Sanitation Campaign. Journal of Human Resources,
51(2):298–327.
United Nations (2016). Clean Water and Sanitation: Why It Matters. Sustainable Development
Goals Briefs.
46
Venkataramanan, V., Crocker, J., Karon, A., and Bartram, J. (2018). Community-led total sanita-
tion: A mixed-methods systematic review of evidence and its quality. Environ Health Perspect.,
126(2):026001.
Wang, S., Moss, J., and Hiller, J. (2006). Applicability and transferability of interventions in
evidence-based public health. Health Promotion International, 21(1):76–83.
Water and Sanitation Program (2008). Indonesia WSP Global Scaling Up Rural Sani-
tation Access (TSSM) Impact Evaluation, Baseline and Endline Surveys 2009-2011. Ref.
IDN_2009_2011_WSP-IE_v01_M_v01_A_PUF.
Water and Sanitation Program (2012). Nigeria loses NGN455 billion annually due to poor sanita-
tion.
Water and Sanitation Program and Network for Engineering and Economics Research and Man-
agement (2009). WSP Global Scaling Up Rural Sanitation Access (TSSM) Impact Evaluation,
Madhya Pradesh State, Baseline and Endline Surveys 2009-2011.
WHO/UNICEF (2015). Progress on Sanitation and Drinking Water: 2015 Update and MDG
Assessment. Technical report, World Health Organization.
WHO/UNICEF/JMP (2017). Progress on drinking water, sanitation and hygiene: 2017 update
and Sustainable Development Goal baselines.
47
Appendix
A Variable definitions
In this section, we provide details on a series of measurements used to construct household and
community-level characteristics. These are based on our household surveys and other auxiliary
datasets.
A.1 Household characteristics
Relative asset wealth
Household survey measures of annual household income had relatively low response rates: 27% of
the households interviewed reported no income at all or refused to answer. A higher response rate
was achieved in a list of questions regarding the ownership of consumer durables. We applied a
principal component analysis to this list, and constructed an index of relative asset wealth based
on the first principal component, following Filmer and Pritchett (2001). Indices of this sort are
often used as a proxy for household long-term wealth, and are included, for example, in the USAID
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) run over 90 countries. Asset wealth indices have also been
used for targeting the PROGRESA conditional cash-transfer programme (McKenzie, 2005). Table
10 lists the asset items elicited in our household survey, and shows their factor loadings which were
used to construct the household wealth indicator.
A.2 Community characteristics
A community denotes the cluster to which a household belongs. On average, clusters are composed
of one to two villages or neighborhoods, and are composed of 220 households (see details in Section
2.2).
Community wealth
Community asset wealth is estimated as the median household’s relative asset wealth score. Our
household survey randomly interviewed 20 households per community, so we chose the median,
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Table 10
Asset items used in the relative asset wealth index
Survey question Factor loading
Ownership of the following durable assets: (1=Yes, 0=No)
Motorcycle/scooter/tricycle 0.1302
Furniture: chairs 0.1561
Furniture: tables 0.1823
Furniture: beds 0.1075
Refrigerator 0.2998
Washing machine 0.1826
Microwave oven 0.1914
Gas cooker 0.2507
Plasma/flat screen TV 0.2173
Other TV 0.2867
Satellite dish (monthly subscription) 0.2272
Other satellite dish (DSTV, etc) 0.2391
Radio/CD/DVD Player 0.2241
Smart phones 0.1265
Other Telephone / phones 0.0886
Computer 0.2195
Air conditioner 0.1061
Power generator 0.2777
Sewing machine 0.1323
Electric iron 0.3172
Pressure cooker 0.1557
Electric fans 0.3162
Number of households included (N=4,722) 4,622
Notes: Questions were coded equal to one if the household reported to own at
least one of each of the items listed in each category. The relative wealth index was
then constructed using the first component of the principal component analysis.
Households with missing data for at least one of the categories were excluded.
instead of the mean, to limit possible distortions due to outliers (i.e. households with extremely
high or low asset wealth). Our main results use a discrete measure of community wealth, i.e. rich
versus poor communities. Poor (rich) communities were those with asset wealth below (above or
equal) the median community. This resulted in two (approximately) identically sized samples.
In addition to community wealth, we propose three alternative measures of communities’ socio-
economic status: a night light index, population density, and isolation.
Night light index
The first alternative measure is the average night light index recorded in 2013, before the inter-
vention began. Using household GPS coordinates, we calculate the geographical centroid of each
community, and define a 5km radius around the centoid. We used nighttime lights data made
available by the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The ob-
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servations on which the data is assembled are made by the Operational Linescan System (OLS)
flown on the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites.
The intensity of nighttime lighting has been shown to be correlated with economic growth, and
proposed as a tool for inferring growth rates at the sub-national level by Henderson et al. (2012).
Moreover, Michalopoulos (2013) show that nighttime light intensity is highly correlated with GDP
per capita and urbanization across African countries.
Isolation
The second alternative is a measure of geographical isolation. We use GIS software to calculate the
linear distance, measured in kilometers, between each community centroid and the nearest admin-
istrative capital. Nigerian states are divided into local government areas (LGAs), and each LGA
has its own administrative headquarters. Note that we measure the distance to the nearest LGA
capital, which may or may not be the capital of the LGA in which a community is located. Results
are unchanged when we use the distance to the nearest state capital as the relevant administrative
capital instead.
Population density
We compute the number of households living within the 5km radius radius around each community
centroid. We rely on a census of households living in the area during mid 2014, conducted in
preparation for the evaluation. This acts as a measure of population density, as the radius area is
equal for all communities (pi × 52 = 79km2).
As in the case for asset wealth, we split the communities in our sample into two groups along
each of these measures. This creates (approximately) identically sized sub-samples.
Toilet coverage
Toilet coverage is the share of households in the community that owned toilets at baseline.
Religious fragmentation
Fragmentation is measured using a religious diversity index that estimates the probability that two
randomly selected households in our sample are of different religions. We focus on religious rather
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than ethnic fragmentation, as our study sample is extremely homogeneous along ethnic lines but
exhibits considerable religious diversity. Similarly defined indices, first used in Mauro (1995), are
frequently used to study ethnic diversity and its impact on economic growth (Easterly and Levine,
1997) or public goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999).
Trust
In a seminal paper on trust, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) define trust based on a question from
the US General Social Survey. It asked respondents if they thought that ‘most people can be
trusted’. Since we want to uncover trust within the community rather than a concept of social
trust, we instead rely on the following question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that you trust
the people in your neighborhood a lot, only a little, or not at all?’. Responses were coded with 2 (a
lot), 1 (a little) or 0 (not at all). We use mean values of household responses within a community
as community-level aggregate.
Social capital
An index of household level social capital was constructed by principal component analysis using
questions related to participation in community life, social contact and provision of services to the
community (see Table 11). This index is similar to the one used in Cameron et al. (2019) who study
CLTS impacts in the province of East Java, Indonesia. Table 11 shows each item’s factor loadings.
We aggregate household responses to a community-level measure by taking the community-specific
mean.
Wealth inequality
We construct a community level measure of inequality based on the household level relative asset
wealth score we construct. The inequality index is constructed by dividing the within community
standard deviation of household asset wealth by the standard deviation of household wealth over
the whole sample. McKenzie (2005) shows that, in the absence of reliable information on household
income or consumption, this relative measure of asset wealth inequality is an informative proxy for
inequality in living standards.
Distribution of key community characteristics
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Table 11
Questions used to construct the household-level social capital index
Survey question Factor loading
How many times in the past 12 months have you ...
... donated blood? 0.0573
...worked on a community project? 0.3129
...attended any public meeting in which there was discussion of town or school affairs? 0.2939
...attended a political meeting or rally? 0.2387
...attended any club or organizational meeting (not including meetings for work)? 0.3204
...had friends over to your home? 0.3662
...been in the home of/invited a friend of a different race? 0.3166
...been in the home of/invited someone of a different neighbourhood? 0.3573
...been in the home of/invited someone you consider to be a community leader? 0.3699
...volunteered? 0.3185
...served as an official or served on a committee of a club or community association? 0.2259
Not including weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? 0.0382
Number of households included (N=4,722) 4,227
Notes: These were multiple choice questions in which the (pre-specified) answers ranged from ‘Never did this’
to ‘More than once a week’. For the purposes of constructing the social capital index, these responses were
standardized, before conducting the principal component analysis. Households with missing data for at least
one of the categories were excluded.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of each of the described community characteristics described above.
They show significant variation, except for the relatively compressed distribution of night lights.
This strongly skewed distribution in night light intensity across communities is one reason for the
discrete measures we use in our preferred specification (and for the sensitivity analysis using the
continuous measures).
Communities’ public infrastructure
Infrastructure in terms of a local school or hospital as well as an indicator whether the community
has paved internal roads serve as further measures of local development status. These measures
come from a community level questionnaire conducted at baseline, during which community leaders
were asked about general characteristics of the community.
Characteristics of village leaders
CLTS is triggered after an initial meeting with the village leader who helps organize the commu-
nity meeting, and aims to spurt collective action towards an open defecation free status of the
community. Hence, we treat the characteristics of village leaders as an additional dimension for
community characteristics. As a community may comprise several villages, these characteristics
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Figure 10
Community characteristics at baseline
Note: Kernel density approximations of the distribution of communities in our sample, according
to a series of community level characteristics. Dashed lines indicate median values, along which
the sample was split to arrive at groups with high and low scores for each trait.
reflect their mean age, experience (years in leadership), and education attainment, all measured at
baseline as part of the community questionnaire.
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B Attrition, compliance and implementation
We provide additional results on survey attrition, on non-compliance of communities with their
treatment assignment, and consider implementation differences across the two study states.
Attrition
First, we test for non-random attrition from household surveys across the three followup studies in
treatment and control communities. Our study showed remarkably low attrition rates: 2.53% in
FU1, 8.81% in FU2 and 11.58% in FU3 (Table 12). Secondly, attrition rates were similar across
treatment arms. Third, we find slightly lower attrition rates in poor communities than in rich ones.
Table 12
Attrition rates by survey wave and treatment status
Completed interviews as % of total attempted Survey wave
FU1 FU2 FU3
(1) (2) (3)
Whole sample 2.53 8.81 11.58
By treatment status:
CLTS 2.51 8.61 12.04
Control 2.55 9.01 11.14
By community level wealth:
Rich communities 3.21 9.85 14.09
Poor communities 1.80 7.69 8.98
Notes: Unconditional attrition rates, as a share of the total attempted
interviews in each survey wave.
In Table 13 we formally test whether treatment status can predict attrition conditional on base-
line characteristics. Columns 1, 4 and 7 show the results of a regression of attrition on the treatment
indicator and district fixed effects, for FU1, FU2, and FU3 respectively. We see that assignment
to CLTS does not predict attrition, and this results is robust to the inclusion of household-level
controls (columns 2, 5 and 8). Hence, we find no evidence of selective attrition that would challenge
the successful randomization demonstrated in Table 2. In FU 1 and FU2, attrition is balanced not
only across treatment groups, but also by community wealth. Only in FU3, we find slightly higher
attrition rates (3pp) among rich communities than poor ones (p-value=0.02). Yet, recall that even
three years after the baseline survey, mean attrition is with around 10% very low.
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Table 13
Tests for non-random attrition
Survey wave: FU1 FU2 FU3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment Status 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.90) (0.96) (0.90) (0.60) (0.49) (0.48) (0.22) (0.71) (0.55)
Poor community -0.01 0.00 -0.03
(0.06) (0.74) (0.02)
Household controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,647 4,505 4,505 4,647 4,505 4,505 4,722 4,546 4,546
Notes: Estimation results for regressions of attrition, by wave, on treatment status, household and com-
munity level characteristics. Errors are clustered at the community level and p-values shown in parenthesis.
Implementation and Triggering
We test if differences in the quality of CLTS delivery may explain heterogeneous impacts between
poor an rich communities. As described in Section 2.2, WaterAid hired two NGOs with CLTS
experience, one from each state, to train local government officials in the facilitation of CLTS
meetings. We thus test for state-level differences in CLTS effectiveness. The interaction term is
small and not significantly different from zero (p-value=0.326), so we do not find evidence for this
hypothesis.
Finally, not all clusters assigned to CLTS were triggered, leading to a fraction of non-complying
clusters. Our main results are thus based on unbiased ITT estimates. In column 2 of Table 14, we
follow Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist and Imbens (1995), redefine the treatment variable
to reflect actual triggering status, and instrument triggered treatment with treatment assignment.
The results on average impact are very similar to the ITT estimates. In columns 3 and 4, we
additionally test if triggered clusters in poor communities may be more reactive to CLTS than in
rich communities. The results are very similar to the ITT estimates. We find CLTS to be only
effective in poor communities, where they reduce OD by 10pp.
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Table 14
CLTS impacts by state and triggering status
Dep.variable: main respondent performs OD
By state IV approach
Sample: All All Rich communities Poor communities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS x Enugu -0.02
(0.43)
CLTS x Ekiti -0.05
p-val (0.04)
Difference -0.03
(0.33)
CLTS -0.04 0.02 -0.10
(0.04) (0.55) (0.00)
First-stage F-statistic 645.50 174.67 817.17
No. of communities 246 246 123 123
No. of observations 12,697 12,697 6,515 6,182
Notes: All specifications control for the household and household head characteristics
listed in Table 3. Errors are clustered at the community level. Naive (unadjusted)
p-values shown in parenthesis.
C Additional results: heterogeneous impacts
C.1 Alternative specifications of community characteristics
First, we present sensitivity analysis based on alternative functional forms of the four community
characteristics. Instead of discretizing measures along their median cutoffs, as presented in the
main text in Table 5, we use continuous measures - with very similar results as Table 15 shows.
Poor treated communities whose wealth is one standard deviation below the mean of zero display a
reduction in OD by 10%, while the two coefficients level out to a close to zero impact for rich CLTS
communities. Similar results are found for density and isolation. Similar to the discrete measures,
once we correct for family wise errors, we find statistically significant heterogeneous impacts only
for community wealth and household density.
In contrast to the results in Table 5, we find no heterogeneous impact in the continuous measure
of nightlight intensity. Figure 10 shows why. In contrast to the other three characteristics, the
distribution of night lights is highly skewed and displays strong bunching around zero for about 90
out of 247 communities. Hence, a discrete specification seems more suited to capture heterogeneity
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in nightlight intensity.
Table 15
CLTS impacts on OD using four measures of community SES
Dep. variable: main respondent performs OD
Community Characteristic (CC) at BL: Asset wealth Night lights Density Isolation Toilet coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CLTS -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
p-value (naive) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
CLTS x CC 0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.03
p-value (naive) (0.00) (0.98) (0.02) (0.05) (0.15)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.01] [0.98] [0.09] [0.22] [0.53]
No. of communities 246 246 246 246 246
No. of observations 12,697 12,697 12,697 12,697 12,697
Notes: All specifications control for the household and household head characteristics listed in Table 3. Errors
are clustered at the community level. Naive (unadjusted) p-values shown in parenthesis. In brackets we present
p-values adjusted by family wise error rate following Romano and Wolf (2005), using 1,000 cluster bootstrap
samples.
Secondly, we run a horserace between our four (imperfectly) correlated measures of communi-
ties’ socio-economic conditions, as we want to determine which one best captures heterogeneous
impacts across communities. Columns 1 to 3 in Table 16 show estimates allowing for pairwise
heterogeneity (i.e. by community wealth and one of the other three variables). We find hetero-
geneous impacts with respect to all three alternative characteristics in the pairwise specifications.
This suggests that each SES indicator captures a community aspect which matters for the success-
ful implementation of CLTS. Yet, the most striking result is this: We detect strongly statistically
significant and economically identical CLTS impacts in poor communities (that are also of equal
magnitude than those estimated in Table 5) in all specifications. In fact, when we include all
interaction terms simultaneously (see column 4), only the community wealth-specific impacts are
statistically significant at the 5% level.
These results underline the robustness of our finding that CLTS is effective only in poor com-
munities, and its effectiveness is decreasing in the wealth of the targeted community. The horserace
exercise suggests that community wealth is the best proxy for local socio-economic conditions in a
community, and plays an important role in mediating CLTS impacts.
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Table 16
Performance of different proxies for community-level socio-
economic status (SES)
Asset wealth compared to: Night lights Density Isolation All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05
(0.11) (0.07) (0.15) (0.05)
Low asset wealth 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CLTS x Low asset wealth -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Low night lights 0.07 0.04
(0.00) (0.12)
CLTS x Low night lights -0.05 -0.03
(0.10) (0.55)
Low density 0.08 0.06
(0.00) (0.03)
CLTS x Low density -0.08 -0.07
(0.01) (0.07)
High isolation 0.07 0.01
(0.00) (0.78)
CLTS x High isolation -0.05 0.01
(0.09) (0.91)
No. of observations 12,697 12,697 12,697 12,697
Notes: All specifications control for the household and household head char-
acteristics listed in Table 3. p-values are shown in parenthesis. Standard
errors are clustered at the community level.
C.2 Are heterogeneous CLTS driven by community or household wealth?
Community wealth is an aggregated measure of household wealth. Richer (poorer) communities are
on average composed of richer (poorer) households.40 So is CLTS is simply (more) effective among
poorer households? We test this hypothesis in two ways. First, we estimate whether CLTS is more
effective among poorer households. Column 1 of Table 17 shows that this is indeed the case. We
find no statistically significant CLTS impact among rich households, while poor households exhibit
a 5pp decline in OD induced by CLTS. Yet, the impact of CLTS in poor households is much smaller
than the 10pp decline in OD detected in poor communities in column 1 in Table 5.
40 69% of the households living in poor clusters have below-median asset wealth, while 66% of the households living
in rich clusters have above-median wealth.
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Table 17
CLTS impacts by household level wealth
Dep. variable: main respondent performs OD
Sample: All communities Rich communities Poor communities
(1) (2) (3)
CLTS x Rich (γr) -0.01 0.01 -0.06
p-value (naive) (0.61) (0.51) (0.07)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.67] [0.67] [0.21]
CLTS x Poor (γr + γd) -0.06 0.01 -0.11
p-value (naive) (0.01) (0.78) (0.00)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.05] [0.78] [0.01]
Difference (γd) -0.05 -0.01 -0.05
p-value (naive) (0.04) (0.86) (0.14)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.18] [0.86] [0.45]
DV control mean (EL, Rich) 0.37 0.33 0.47
DV control mean (EL, Poor) 0.60 0.45 0.69
No. of TUs 246 123 123
No. of obs. 12,697 6,515 6,182
Notes: All specifications control for the household and household head characteristics listed
in Table 3. Errors are clustered at the community level. Naive (unadjusted) p-values shown
in parenthesis. In brackets we present p-values adjusted by family wise error rate following
Romano and Wolf (2005), using 1,000 cluster bootstrap samples and estimated jointly for all
regressions presented in Tables 17 and 18.
Secondly, if CLTS impacts are heterogeneous across households rather than communities, we
would expect to find stronger CLTS impacts (in effect size and statistical significance) among poor
households in either community type. For this purpose, we split households along the sample
median into poor and rich, and separately estimate heterogeneous CLTS impacts by household
wealth in rich and poor communities. The results in columns 2 and 3 reject this hypothesis.
Instead, they show statistically significant impacts of CLTS for poor and rich households, but only
in poor communities. Additionally, there is no evidence of differential CLTS impacts among poor
households in either community type.
Aggregating to community level may reduce measurement error in household wealth, and thus
provide a more robust measure of households’ SES, or long term wealth. To address this concern,
we additionally used (completed primary) education of the household head as a proxy for house-
hold wealth, and found no evidence of heterogeneity in treatment impacts along this dimension (see
column 1 in Table 18).
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Table 18
CLTS impacts on OD by household characteristics
Dep. variable: main respondent performs OD
Household characteristic (at BL): Low ed. HoH Female HoH Any children
(1) (2) (3)
CLTS x No (γr) -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
p-value (naive) (0.04) (0.13) (0.12)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.11] [0.30] [0.30]
CLTS x Yes (γr + γd) -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
p-value (naive) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Difference (γd) -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
p-value (naive) (0.12) (0.50) (0.37)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.45] [0.77] [0.77]
DV control mean (EL, No) 0.64 0.61 0.63
DV control mean (EL, Yes) 0.69 0.65 0.61
No. of TUs 246 246 246
No. of obs. 12,697 12,697 12,697
Notes: All specifications control for age and employment status of the household head,
as well as household size. Errors are clustered at the community level and adjusted
by family wise error rate following Romano and Wolf (2005).
Other household characteristics
It is often posited that women and households with children may exhibit a higher willingness to
invest into health and sanitation technologies.41 In columns 2 and 3 of Table 18, we test these
hypotheses using indicators for female headed households and those with children, and find no
evidence of heterogeneous CLTS impacts in either of these dimensions.
C.3 Sensitivity analysis of CLTS impacts on sanitation investments
We re-estimate Table 6, replacing community wealth by the other three measures of socio-economic
conditions. CLTS increases (functioning and general) toilet ownership in communities with low
nightlight intensity (see top panel in Table 19), low density (second panel) and high isolation
(third panel). Using these alternative community SES measures, we find no CLTS impact in rich
communities in terms of sanitation investments.
41 With respect to CLTS, Kar (2003) poses that women are ‘one of the greatest internal forces for mobilisation
and promotional activities in the villages’. Women may enjoy larger returns from private sanitation in terms of
personal safety and privacy. Evidence from other health enhancing investments suggests the existence gender-specific
preferences in certain domains, such as health and children’s welfare (Miller and Mobarak, 2013).
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Equally in line with the results presented in Table 6 in the main text, we find little evidence of
behavioural change in terms of usage of existing toilets, or shared usage. There is weak indication
that shared toilet use increases in areas that are close to the LGA’s capital, have high nightlight
intensity and are more densely populated. Yet, the differential impact of CLTS across community
groups along shared usage is never statistically significant.
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Table 19
Channels of OD reduction
Outcome =1 if: Owns toilet Owns functioning toilet Usage (if functioning) Shared use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heterogeneous impacts by nightlight intensity
CLTS x High (γr) -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02
p-value (naive) (0.70) (0.45) (0.31) (0.02)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.70] [0.57] [0.57] [0.05]
CLTS x Low (γr + γd) 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.00
p-value (naive) 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.97
p-value (MHT robust) [0.18] [0.01] [0.25] [0.97]
Difference (γd) 0.06 0.09 0.05 -0.01
p-value (naive) (0.10) (0.01) (0.08) (0.36)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.19] [0.02] [0.19] [0.36]
DV control mean (EL, High) 0.45 0.45 0.57 0.03
DV control mean (EL, Low) 0.29 0.28 0.48 0.03
Heterogeneous impacts by household density
CLTS x High (γr) -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.01
p-value (naive) (0.30) (0.54) (0.80) (0.03)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.56] [0.78] [0.80] [0.09]
CLTS x Low (γr + γd) 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.00
p-value (naive) 0.01 0.00 0.43 0.81
p-value (MHT robust) [0.03] [0.01] [0.69] [0.81]
Difference (γd) 0.09 0.10 0.02 -0.01
p-value (naive) (0.01) (0.01) (0.43) (0.63)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.03] [0.02] [0.68] [0.68]
DV control mean (EL, High) 0.46 0.45 0.58 0.03
DV control mean (EL, Low) 0.26 0.25 0.44 0.03
Heterogeneous impacts by degree of isolation
CLTS x High (γr) 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.00
p-value (naive) (0.05) (0.01) (0.34) (0.77)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.12] [0.01] [0.59] [0.77]
CLTS x Low (γr + γd) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
p-value (naive) 0.79 0.68 0.64 0.08
p-value (MHT robust) [0.90] [0.90] [0.90] [0.23]
Difference (γd) -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 0.01
p-value (naive) (0.08) (0.01) (0.32) (0.68)
p-value (MHT robust) [0.22] [0.03] [0.54] [0.68]
DV control mean (EL, High) 0.30 0.29 0.52 0.03
DV control mean (EL, Low) 0.43 0.42 0.54 0.03
Number of communities 246 246 245 246
Number of observations 12,497 12,497 7,113 12,697
Notes: All specifications control for the household and household head characteristics listed in Table 3. p-values
are shown in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the community level and are adjusted for family-wise
error rate following Romano and Wolf (2005), using 1,000 cluster bootstrap samples.
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D Community wealth measures in household surveys in develop-
ing countries
A similar community wealth index to the one in our study sample is widely available in the demo-
graphic and household surveys (DHS). These are nationally representative samples of conducted in
90 developing countries. Using the 2013 Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), we show
that a community wealth index can be easily constructed for a national CLTS targeting strategy,
and that it precision is similar to the measure in our study data.
We first construct a new, comparable asset wealth index (the ‘DHS index’) in both samples,
our study and in the DHS. It is based on the joint subset of durable asset items recorded in both
surveys.42 To ensure national representativeness, we construct the index by performing a principal
component analysis of the questions on the DHS sample only. The resulting index in our study
data is created by applying the estimated factor loadings to households’ responses.
In our study sample, the simplified, new DHS index, which is based on factor loadings from the
DHS sample, is closely matched with the original household wealth index (henceforth: the ‘Study
index’), which was based on a more comprehensive list of asset items (see Table 10). Figure 11
shows that the two measures are highly positively correlated (ρ=0.77, significant at the 1% level).
The newly created DHS index explains up to 58% of the variation in the more comprehensive Study
index.
To put community and household wealth in our study sample into context, we show where they
fit into the Nigerian wealth distribution. Figure 12 shows the distribution of household wealth in
the representative DHS sample (black line), and in poor (rich) communities in our study sample,
depicted by the blue (gray) line. First, the plot reveals that our study sample does not include
the poorest Nigerian households. This is not surprising since Ekiti and Enugu are located in
the relatively wealthier Centre-South of the country, with the poorest states located in the North.
Second, our sample households are mostly located close to the median of Nigerian household wealth.
42 Asset items elicited in both surveys are: bicycles, motorcycles (scooters, tricycles, etc), cars and trucks, refrig-
erators, radio, TV, bank account, telephone (mobile or fixed), improved water, improved sanitation and livestock
(cattle, goats and sheep, pigs, poultry). The inclusion of livestock is motivated by the purpose of capturing farming
households. Indeed, the loading factors for these four elements are negative.
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Figure 11
Household asset wealth indices from our study data are highly consistent
Note: Scatter plot showing the asset wealth scores obtained for each household in our study sample.
Each dot represents one household. The y-axis shows the value for the asset wealth index used in
our study, built using asset ownership questions from our household survey (see Table 10). The x-
axis shows the score obtained in the asset wealth index constructed using only those questions that
were included in both our household survey and in the DHS, for the same sample of households.
See text for more details.
For a similar comparison by community wealth, we construct community wealth deciles for
Nigeria, and place poor and rich study communities into these (see Figure 13).43 Our study
communities are typically located towards the middle (4th to 7th decile) of the Nigerian community
wealth distribution, rather than in the tails. Some study communities that we have classified as poor
(blue), using the median in our study, fall into the higher deciles of the Nigerian community wealth
distribution. Overall, however, 80% of the poor communities in our sample (blue) are in deciles 3
43 We calculate the median DHS index value within each DHS cluster, and within each study community. We define
deciles using only the DHS sample, and use the decile cutoff values to assign study communities to the corresponding
wealth deciles. Community wealth is determined using the DHS index to ensure comparability. We retain, however,
the classification of rich and poor communities used in the remainder of the paper, which is defined using the more
comprehensive Study wealth index.
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Figure 12
Distribution of the DHS wealth index by sample
Note: Kernel density plot showing the distribution of DHS index scores among the DHS sample
(black), rich (gray) and poor (blue) communities in our study sample. The DHS index is the asset
wealth index constructed using only those questions that were included in both our household
survey and the DHS.
to 5 of the Nigerian distribution, while 88% of the richest communities in our sample (white) are
in the upper deciles of the Nigerian distribution, i.e. deciles 6 to 10. Hence, poor communities in
our sample are generally below the median of the national distribution. In contrast, the majority
of rich communities in our study are richer than the median community in Nigeria.
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Figure 13
Distribution of study communities in DHS community wealth deciles for Nigeria
Note: Distribution of the communities in our study along community wealth deciles for the whole of
Nigeria, estimated using the 2013 DHS. The wealth index used for this comparison was constructed
using a set of questions that was included in both our survey and the DHS household questionnaire.
E Additional information for international comparison of CLTS
impacts
We calculate average night light intensities at the lowest geographical level available in each study.
Table 20 gives a detailed overview of the level of geographical disaggregation and the number of
observed geographical units.
In the Nigerian and Indonesian data, GPS coordinates at the household level are available, so
we calculate average nighttime intensities within a 10km radius of each cluster centroid. In India,
we calculate sub-district level measures of night light for 15 sub-districts in which the study was
conducted. In the case of Tanzania, we extract average night light intensity at the district level
level (10 districts). In line with our analysis in the previous sections, we exploit within-study varia-
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tion in nighttime intensity to calculate treatment effects separately for the poor and richest halves
of each sample. The exceptions are Mali and Bangladesh, for whom detailed location informa-
tion is not available. In Mali (Bangladesh), we assign the average nightlight intensity of the state
(sub-district) in which each study took place, but do not estimate heterogeneous treatment effects.44
44 The Mali experiment was conducted in the state of Koulikoro, the Bangladesh experiment in the sub-district of
Tanore. Column 4 in Table 20 illustrates the high within-state variation in nightlight intensity around a very small
mean intensity in Koulikoro.
67
Table 20
Summary statistics: night light intensity by study
Level of Night Light extraction Summary statistics
Country of study Unit N Mean (µ) Mean (σ)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bangladesh Sub-district 1 0.93 2.14
India Sub-district 15 1.60 2.76
Poor 8 0.54 1.60
Rich 7 2.82 4.08
Indonesia Cluster 160 7.82 4.04
Poor 81 5.35 2.86
Rich 79 10.35 5.25
Mali State 1 0.13 1.59
Nigeria Cluster 242 2.06 2.17
Poor 120 0.33 1.01
Rich 122 3.77 3.31
Tanzania District 10 0.01 0.23
Poor 6 0.00 0.13
Rich 4 0.02 0.38
Notes: Geographical unit at which night lights data was measured in each
country of study, and summary statistics about this data. Column 1 shows the
lowest administrative unit at which we could map both survey observations and
location, in each case. For example, in the case of Bangladesh, all we know is
that the study was conducted in the sub-district of Tanore. In the case of India,
on the other hand, we managed to map each survey observation to one of 15
sub-districts in the state of Madhya Pradesh in which the study was conducted.
Column 2 states how many different units were identified in each study. Column
3 estimates the mean of µ for each country. In the studies in Bangladesh and
Mali, this is the mean of a single value: average night light intensity over the
single unit available (Sub-district and State, respectively). Column 4 shows the
average within-unit standard deviation. Night light intensity is truncated at
zero, so higher average intensities are associated with higher within-unit varia-
tion.
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